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N I C O L A S  C O R N E L L  
Competition Wrongs 
abstract.  In both philosophical and legal circles, it is typically assumed that wrongs depend 
upon having one’s rights violated. But within any market-based economy, market participants may 
be wronged by the conduct of other actors in the marketplace. Due to my illicit business tactics, 
you may lose profits, customers, employees, reputation, access to capital, or any number of other 
sources of value. This Article argues that such competition wrongs are an example of wrongs that 
arise without an underlying right, contrary to the typical philosophical and legal assumption. The 
Article thus draws upon various forms of business law to illustrate what is a conceptual point: that 
we can and do wrong one another in ways that do not involve violating our private entitlements 
but rather violating only public norms. 
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introduction  
In any minimally developed economy, market participants will sometimes be 
wronged by the conduct of others. Due to my illicit business tactics, you may 
lose profits, customers, employees, reputation, access to capital, or other sources 
of value. My misconduct, in such a case, leaves you personally aggrieved.
1
 How 
are we to understand the wrongs that occur in the course of competition? In what 
does the complaint of the injured competitor consist? I think that probing these 
questions may shed light on deep moral and legal issues about rights, wronging, 
harm, and accountability. Competition tests the relationship between these basic 
concepts. 
The wrongs that occur in the course of competition are noteworthy. Most 
instances of lost profits or lost consumers are hardly grounds for complaint. On 
the contrary, such economic setbacks offer a prime example of unobjectionable 
harming. For this reason, they are frequently cited to illustrate the conceptual 
distance between wronging and harming. Here, for example, is how Arthur Rip-
stein puts it: 
Examples of harms that are not wrongful are . . . familiar . . . . If you 
build a better mousetrap, I may lose customers; if you close your hotel, 
my neighboring restaurant may suffer; if you show up before me, there 
may be no seats left on the bus or milk left at the store . . . . If contests 
really are fair, and the undertakings voluntary, any harm that ensues is 




1. I use the noun and verb “wrong” in a sense different than the merely adjectival use. “A wrong” 
or “wronging” implies that someone was “wronged”—someone has standing to complain, 
resent, hold accountable, or demand compensation—which is more than merely saying that 
someone acted wrongly. Some conduct—ranging from tax evasion to illegal drug use to chop-
ping down old-growth trees—might in some circumstances be wrong without constituting a 
wrong to anyone. In this sense, wrongs are the traditional subject matter of private law, 
whereas criminal law might, on many views at least, be thought to concern whether the de-
fendant has acted wrongly. 
2. Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 228-29 (2006). The same 
point may also be made about benefits, rather than harms. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS 
PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 9-10 (2d ed. 2015) (“That my act procures 
me a benefit or causes harm all by itself proves nothing. If I open a restaurant near your hotel 
and prosper as I draw your guests away from the standard hotel fare you offer, this benefit I 
draw from you places me under no obligation to you. I should make restitution only if I ben-




The point is that many economic harms—even those that may have grave reper-
cussions for the livelihood of the sufferer
3
—are not wrongs. The competitor who 
drives others out of business with a better product or price is not answerable to 
those who fall by the wayside. This is an important insight that I have no inten-
tion to dispute. 
That insight might, however, lead one to imagine that the harms that arise 
in competition contrast with those harms that do wrong others. Ronald 
Dworkin describes the contrast as follows: 
We need to . . . distinguish[] between two kinds of harm you might suf-
fer because other people, like you, are leading their own lives with their 
own responsibility for their own fates. The first is bare competition 
harm, and the second is deliberate harm. No one could even begin to lead 
a life if bare competition harm were forbidden. We live our lives mostly 
like swimmers in separate demarcated lanes. One swimmer gets the blue 
ribbon or the job or the lover or the house on the hill that another 
wants . . . . [E]ach person may concentrate on swimming his own race 
without concern for the fact that if he wins, another person must there-
fore lose. That inevitable kind of harm to others is, as the old Roman 
lawyers put it, damnum sine injuria. It is part of our personal responsibil-
ity—it is what makes our separate responsibilities personal—that we ac-
cept the inevitability and permissibility of competition harm.
4
 
Dworkin’s thought is that competition harms can provide a useful contrast to 
illuminate the wrongs of deliberate (and negligent) harming.
5
 
There is some element missing from bare competition harm that prevents it 
from amounting to a wrong. For Ripstein and Dworkin and other like-minded 
thinkers, that missing element is a right or entitlement. The mousetrap manu-
facturer has no right to his or her customers, so when a competitor comes along 
with a better design, the harm does not constitute a wrong. The restauranteur 
has no right to an advantageous business environment, so there is no wrong 
when the neighboring hotel closes. And the swimmer has no right to the blue 
ribbon, so when a faster swimmer takes the prize, no wronging transpires. In 
each case, no right has been violated, even if a harm has been suffered. The harm 
 
3. Ripstein, supra note 2, at 239 (“No matter how significant the impact on those who lose at fair 
contests, the loss does not amount to the despotism of the winner over the loser.”). 
4. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 287-88 (2011). 
5. Compare Ripstein, who follows the passage quoted in the text above with the sentence: 
“Other harms do interfere with sovereignty, but it is that interference, not their harmfulness, 
that merits prohibition.” Ripstein, supra note 2, at 229. 
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arises simply in the course of—to use Dworkin’s evocative metaphor—everyone 
swimming in their own lanes. 
The conclusion, for these thinkers, is that wrongs require a rights violation. 
Wrongs arise when a party’s sovereignty is compromised—when a party is de-
nied independence in a sphere in which he or she is entitled to independence.
6
 
Wrongs arise, that is, when someone crosses over into another’s lane. Thus, from 
the fact that not all competitive harms constitute wrongs, one arrives at the con-
clusion that wrongs are constituted by transgressions into another’s sphere of 
control. 
I reject this lesson that rights-oriented thinkers like Ripstein and Dworkin 
draw from the existence of nonwrongful competition harm. In particular, I be-
lieve that a rights violation is not, in fact, a necessary ingredient of a wrong.
7
 We 
can and do wrong one another in ways that do not involve crossing into another’s 
lane. A closer examination of competition injuries reveals as much. Through 
such an examination, I will argue that sometimes a market actor wrongs a com-
petitor by his or her illicit tactics even though no rights have been violated.
8
 
This thesis can be broken down into two subtheses. First, I claim that, in the 
context of illicit competition, competitors suffer a distinctive wrong. When a 
party engages in, say, false advertising or monopolistic practices, this conduct 
will often constitute a violation of norms that protect the public at large. None-
theless, I claim that the competitor is specially (though not always uniquely) 
positioned to complain about the violation. Her grievance is personal, not gen-
eralized. Call this the standing claim. 
Second, I claim that some competition wrongs cannot be explained in terms 
of any independently specifiable right of the competitor. That is, there is no right 
of the competitor grounding the wrong. Call this the independence claim. Of 
course, it is always possible to say that parties have a “right” not to suffer a certain 
kind of wrong. But my question is whether the distinctive wrong to a competitor 
can be explained in terms of some entitlement—some sphere of control. Such an 
 
6. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 295 (“Sometimes I suffer harm only because I am in the wrong 
place at the wrong time; I stand in the way of others achieving their aims. Competition harm 
is typically like that; I am harmed because my small grocery store is in the town chosen by a 
supermarket chain. But in other circumstances I would suffer because others have usurped a 
decision that dignity requires me to make for myself—the decision what use is to be made of 
my body or my life.”). 
7. For a different but related discussion of how wrongs and rights may come apart, see Nicolas 
Cornell, Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties, 43 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 109 (2015). 
8. Cf. Homer Blosser Reed, The Morals of Monopoly and Competition, 26 INT’L J. ETHICS 258, 275 
(1916) (arguing that wrongs of monopolistic conduct should not be evaluated by looking 




explanation, to be meaningful, would require that the entitlement play some ex-
planatory or functional role apart from merely labeling what actions may count 
as wrongs. 
To understand my full aims here, it is necessary to appreciate that the argu-
ments of Ripstein and Dworkin above—to which I am responding—are mani-
festations of much broader normative disputes. Both moral theorizing and pri-
vate-law theorizing tend to divide between consequentialist and 
nonconsequentialist approaches. Consequentialist approaches typically take 
harm (and benefit) to be the foundational normative idea, and they tend toward 
a collectivist balancing of overall harms and benefits.
9
 Nonconsequentialist ap-
proaches, in contrast, typically reject harm as a starting point and reject collec-
tivist balancing, preferring instead to start from individual rights and freedom. 
In contemporary theorizing about private law, this division largely manifests as 
the division between law and economics, on the one hand, and corrective justice, 
on the other hand. 
Two related arguments often figure prominently in these debates. First, non-
consequentialists argue that consequentialist approaches cannot explain the way 
that both morality and private law connect individuals.
10
 It is not merely the fact 
that some acts are wrongful that needs explaining but rather the fact that some 
acts wrong others. To be wronged is to have a grievance, to have the personal 
standing to hold another person accountable. That familiar interpersonal ac-
countability cannot be explained merely by showing that an action is impermis-
sible. Rather, the action must connect the parties in some noncontingent way.
11
 
Second, nonconsequentialists argue that harm itself lacks the normative sig-
nificance to explain why some acts are wrongs. There are wrongs without harm, 
 
9. It is, for instance, illuminating to contrast the above-quoted passages from Ripstein and 
Dworkin with RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 8 (9th ed. 2014) (“A social 
cost diminishes the wealth of society; a private cost rearranges that wealth. Competition is a 
rich source of ‘pecuniary’ as distinct from ‘technological’ externalities—that is, of wealth 
transfers from, as distinct from cost impositions on, unconsenting parties. Suppose A opens 
a gas station opposite B’s gas station and as a result siphons revenues from B. Since B’s loss is 
A’s gain, there is no diminution in overall wealth and hence no social cost, even though B is 
harmed by A’s competition and so incurs a private cost. It would be different if to eliminate 
B’s competition, A destroyed B’s gasoline pumps. That would reduce the total stock of goods 
in the economy.”). 
10. See, e.g., R. JAY WALLACE, THE MORAL NEXUS 76-95 (2019); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW 46-48 (1995); Michael Thompson, What Is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle About 
Justice, in REASON AND VALUE: THEMES FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ 333, 333-40 (R. 
Jay Wallace et al. eds., 2004). 
11. This argument is developed especially clearly in WEINRIB, supra note 10, at 40-42. See also 
JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 303-28 (1992). 
 
the yale law journal 129:2030  2020 
2036 
and harms that constitute no wrong.
12
 We need some other foundational nor-
mative concept, and rights—individual claims or entitlements—fill the explana-
tory void. The idea that rights ground our accountability relations becomes the 
core axiom of corrective-justice theorizing. As then-Chief Judge Cardozo fa-
mously put it, 
What the plaintiff must show is ‘a wrong’ to herself, i. e. [sic], a violation 
of her own right, and not merely a wrong to some one else, nor conduct 
‘wrongful’ because unsocial, but not ‘a wrong’ to any one . . . . [T]he 
commission of a wrong imports the violation of a right . . . .
13
 
As illustrated by Ripstein and Dworkin, competition is taken to illuminate 
both the divergence between wrongs and harm, as well as the connection be-
tween wrongs and rights. 
I agree completely with the first argument: both morality and private law are 
deeply and essentially relational, not merely instrumental. In this sense, I stand 
firmly with the nonconsequentialists. Indeed, part of my aim is to suggest that 
this relational accountability—the distinctive standing of one who is aggrieved 
and wants to hold another accountable—is even more pervasive than is typically 
appreciated by theorists attuned to the relational character of law and morality. 
But I am skeptical that interpersonal accountability must always be 
grounded in individual rights. It is true that harms do not always generate 
wrongs and that, in this sense, harm is not itself sufficient to explain the relation 
between wrongdoer and victim. But that does not mean that all wrongs are about 
individual rights and entitlements. To flesh out this thought, I examine some 
exemplary American competition cases. I contend that these cases display a com-
mitment to the idea that the plaintiffs have been wronged (the standing claim) 
and yet that the explanations offered for these wrongs do not—and could not—
trace back to ideas about rights and entitlements (the independence claim). If 
this is correct, it suggests that rights-based thinking can overstate our independ-
ence from one another. Even as we each have our own separate swimming lanes, 
 
12. See, e.g., Ripstein, supra note 2. Though I have focused on Ripstein’s claim that not all harm—
in particular, harm in the course of competition—amounts to a wrong, he devotes more en-
ergy to the opposite claim, namely that there may be “harmless trespass.” Id. at 218-28; cf. 
WALLACE, supra note 10, at 9 (“Wrongful actions can have harmful effects on other persons 
without wronging them in particular, and those who are wronged by an action need not spe-
cifically be harmed by it, taking everything into account.”). 
13. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928); cf. WALLACE, supra note 
10, at 98 (“Claimholders . . . are in a privileged position by comparison with the other people 
who might be affected by the agent’s actions. If A flouts a duty that is owed to B, then it is B 
in particular who is wronged or has suffered a moral injury, and B would seem to have a spe-
cific grievance or complaint about what A has done that is not shared with other parties.”). 
competition wrongs 
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our mutual accountability extends beyond merely respecting those boundaries. 
As members of a community, we have a stake in how others act more generally 
such that we can be personally wronged by acts contrary to our public norms. 
My arguments are thus addressed in the first instance to the dominant cor-
rective-justice paradigm and to the contemporary theories of relational norma-
tivity. I will largely take for granted that law and life are fundamentally relational 
in a way that is at odds with purely consequentialist theorizing. Nevertheless, by 
pressing back on the strong individualism of the rights-based approach, my ar-
guments may resonate with more collectivist thinking and may also offer a con-
ception of corrective justice that is more palatable to consequentialist thinkers. 
On my view, public considerations have a bigger place to play in interpersonal 
accountability than rights-based approaches have recognized. An individual’s 
personal grievance against another may spring from obligations owed to the 
community as a whole. 
If this is correct, however, it also means that there is more ground to be cov-
ered by interpersonal accountability. And this may open the door to seeing 
swathes of the law that have been traditionally viewed in narrowly instrumen-
talist terms in more deeply moralized ways. Antitrust law and marketing law 
may be regarded not merely as creating rules for an efficient market but as real-
izing a meaningful form of accountability between parties. And, more broadly, 
we may come to see much public regulatory law—even, say, environmental 
law—as potentially giving rise to private moral grievances. 
i .  the standing claim 
In this Part, I defend the claim that market actors are sometimes wronged by 
the competitive practices of other market actors. I refer to this as the standing 
claim, because the point is that injured competitors have special standing to com-
plain or hold wrongdoers accountable. The concept of a wrong is defined in 
terms of a set of interpersonal practices and relations. Some conduct—for exam-
ple, illegal drug use or tax evasion—might be wrong without wronging anyone 
in particular. To say that a party is wronged is to say that the party is not a mere 
bystander but rather might assert a specific complaint in his or her own name. A 
wronged party might feel personal resentment—not mere general indignation—
and demand remedial actions like apology or compensation. Such attitudes and 
actions are inapt when conduct is merely wrong without wronging anyone in 
particular: tax evasion or illegal drug use may ground feelings of indignation or 
even outrage but not personal resentment that would make appropriate apology, 
forgiveness, compensation, or the like. It is wrongs, not mere wrongful conduct, 
that ground such attitudes and responses. The standing claim is thus a moral 
claim about how parties relate to one another ex post. 
the yale law journal 129:2030  2020 
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To illustrate the standing of competitors, I turn to some cases. Market actors 
are often afforded legal standing to bring a complaint. As I describe, the com-
plained-of conduct ranges from direct interference to much more detached mis-
conduct. Of course, it is possible that the legal standing granted to competitors 
is either a mistake or a matter of policy rather than morality. I will return to these 
possibilities at the end of this Part. But I hope that examination of the legal cases 
will at least provide a prima facie case for the moral claim that misconduct can 
wrong the competitors it harms. 
A. Interference 
Let me start with a run-of-the-mill case of dubious competition. Lehigh Cor-
poration was a real-estate broker in Florida in the 1970s. Lehigh promoted the 
sale of property by providing prospective buyers with expense-paid accommo-
dations and the opportunity to see Lehigh’s properties and talk to salespeople. 
Leroy Azar was a former Lehigh employee who was familiar with Lehigh’s busi-
ness model. He adopted a practice of following Lehigh customers—whom he 
could spot on the street based on their big envelopes of sales literature—and per-




Morally speaking, Azar wronged Lehigh. Lehigh might reasonably resent his 
activities. He was, after all, taking its customers, and not in an honorable way. 
And tort law agreed that there was a wrong here. A Florida court concluded that 
Azar was tortiously interfering with advantageous business relations.
15
 Tort law 
generally recognizes torts for interference with contractual relations and, in most 
jurisdictions, with prospective economic advantage. The basic idea is that a party 
who, like Azar, intentionally causes the transactions of others to collapse can be 
liable for doing so.
16
 The legal standing is suggestive: there seems to be a distinct 
wrong suffered by individual parties like Lehigh. 
One might grant this point but remain skeptical of the broader thesis that 
the wrong Lehigh suffered cannot be explained by a right held by Lehigh. It is 
not my aim to defend the independence claim yet. But notice, for now, that tor-
tious interference does not obviously track legal entitlements.
17
 In this particular 
 
14. Azar v. Lehigh Corp., 364 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
15. Id. 
16. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
17. For a good discussion of the interference torts and how they might be explained by a correc-
tive-justice approach, see J.W. Neyers, The Economic Torts as Corrective Justice, 17 TORTS L.J. 




case, federal law entitled Lehigh’s customers to rescind their purchases at any 
time within three days of signing, a right that Azar was deliberately exploiting.
18
 
The wrong of tortious interference can thus arise even where the victim had no 
legal right to her customer or her deal.
19
 One might respond that Lehigh had a 
right not to its deal per se, but against Azar’s causing its customers to abandon 
their deals. On this score, it is worth noting that Lehigh would have had no tort 
claim against Azar had he been acting as a concerned consumer advocate or or-
ganizing a lawful boycott.
20
 It is therefore difficult to pinpoint the sphere of true 
entitlement that Azar invaded. For present purposes, however, the important 
point is that parties like Lehigh suffer wrongs at the hands of interfering com-
petitors. 
B. Exclusivity 
Azar induced third parties to back out of existing deals; other competitors 
might induce third parties not to enter into contracts in the first place. In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, Kodak dominated the camera market, accounting for over 
sixty percent of camera sales.
21
 It did not, however, make flash equipment.
22
 
Over the years, Sylvania and GE developed various flash technologies and ap-
proached Kodak about using them in its cameras. In each instance, Kodak en-
tered into joint development agreements requiring that these technologies—to 
which Kodak had not contributed—not be disclosed to any other firms.
23
 A 
smaller camera manufacturer, Berkey Photo, sued Kodak, alleging that these 
joint development agreements denied Berkey access to the best flash technolo-
gies and the opportunity to bring to market cameras that would compete with 
Kodak’s.
24
 The complaint, in short, was that Kodak was inducing suppliers not 
 
breach of contract is a property-rights approach, but that the most promising such explana-
tions for unlawful interference with economic relations are an abuse-of-rights approach or an 
approach based on public right). 
18. Azar, 364 So. 2d at 862. 
19. There might be no legal entitlement at all. There can be tortious interference even where the 
initial contract is legally unenforceable. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Kessler, 286 A.2d 95, 97-98 
(Md. 1972). 
20. See, e.g., Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1316-18 (8th Cir. 1980). 
21. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 1979). 
22. Id. at 299. 
23. Id. at 299-301. 
24. Id. at 301. 
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to deal with Berkey and other competitors.
25
 The Second Circuit affirmed a judg-
ment in Berkey’s favor.
26
 
Exclusive dealing is a cousin of tortious interference. Berkey’s complaint was 
based in statutory antitrust law, not the common law of torts. But the continuity 
should be clear. Structurally, the cases similarly involve private plaintiffs seeking 
a private remedy. And there is substantive continuity as well. In both tortious 
interference and exclusive dealing arrangements, the wrongdoer influences a 
third party to modify its economic relationship with the wrongdoer’s competitor, 
thereby denying that competitor prospective economic gains. They are wrongs 
of a similar form. Morally speaking, the conduct seems analogous. 
Antitrust is not the only statutory basis for private redress for an agreement 
not to deal. State unfair-competition laws may offer similar standing. For exam-
ple, relying upon California’s unfair competition law, businesses recently suc-
ceeded in suing competitors for forcing employees to sign noncompete clauses, 
alleging that the competitors had impaired their ability to acquire talent.
27
 Such 
statutory competition suits should be seen as continuous with traditional inter-
ference torts. They similarly involve an outsider undermining relations between 
two contracting parties, and they similarly offer the injured competitor a private 
avenue for redress. 
C. Marketing 
Another way that market competitors sometimes wrong one another occurs 
when businesses engage in false or misleading advertising. Seemingly recogniz-
ing such injuries, the law affords private causes of action to businesses injured 




25. Exclusive dealing as an antitrust violation was established in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 
342 U.S. 143 (1951), in which a dominant newspaper refused advertisements from any busi-
ness that chose to also advertise with a new local radio station. The newspaper argued that it 
had a right to select its advertisers, to which the court responded, “We do not dispute that 
general right. ‘But the word “right” is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls . . . .’” Id. at 155 
(quoting Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921)). 
26. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 304. 
27. See Diversant, LLC v. Artech Info. Sys., LLC, Civ No. 18-12133, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210749 
(D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2018); Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2009); 
Application Grp., Inc. v. Hunter Grp., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Ct. App. 1998). 
28. At the federal level, the Lanham Act allows such suits. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018). State 
unfair competition laws or unfair and deceptive acts and practice laws also often afford such 
standing. For a good discussion of false-advertising law and its potential connections with 
private law, see Gregory Klass, False Advertising Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEW PRI-




These misleading statements need not be about the injured competitor or its 
products; a company that makes false statements about its own products may be 
liable to competitors whom the false statements harmed. 
Consider the facts of POM Wonderful, LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.
29
 POM Wonder-
ful grows pomegranates and sells various pomegranate juices, including a pom-
egranate-blueberry juice. Under its Minute Maid brand, Coca-Cola marketed a 
competing juice blend with a label featuring the words “POMEGRANATE BLUE-
BERRY.”
30
 Below that, in smaller, lower-case letters, the label read, “flavored 
blend of 5 juices,” and then, in even smaller type, “from concentrate with added 
ingredients and other natural flavors.”
31
 In fact, the Minute Maid juice blend 
contained 99.4% apple and grape juices, 0.3% pomegranate juice, 0.2% blue-
berry juice, and 0.1% raspberry juice.
32
 
POM brought suit, alleging that the Minute Maid label constituted false or 
misleading advertising. Pause for a moment to appreciate why POM would take 
itself to be aggrieved by Minute Maid’s marketing. Minute Maid had said noth-
ing about POM.
33
 But POM—which manufactures actual pomegranate juice—
naturally regarded Minute Maid as illegitimately capturing some of POM’s 
would-be consumers. Morally speaking, this is a perfectly coherent complaint. 
As with interference and exclusivity, here too the injury stems from the compet-
itor’s lost relations with a third party—in this case, consumers. It should be un-
surprising that the law offers an avenue of redress. 
In response, Coca-Cola argued that the case should be dismissed because the 
Minute Maid label was compliant with the Food and Drug Administration’s 
(FDA) labeling regulations.
34
 The relevant regulation stated that, if a juice 
 
29. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). 
30. Id. at 2233. 
31. Id. at 2235. 
32. Id. 
33. Some false-advertising cases involve claims about or comparisons with a rival product and 
thus can appear akin to defamation actions. But many—like POM Wonderful—do not. They 
involve only misleading portrayals of a product’s benefit, like portraying a vibrating razor as 
raising hair upwards for an especially close shave, Schick Mfg., Inc. v. Gillette Co., 372 F. Supp. 
2d. 273 (D. Conn. 2005); or misleading promotional tactics, like having employees block vote 
for the helpfulness of positive Amazon customer reviews to raise those reviews’ salience, Vit-
amins Online, Inc. v. Heartwise, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-982-DAK, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355, at 
*4-5 (D. Utah Feb. 9, 2016). In such cases, the injury is simply lost market share. One court 
has even held that in a two-player market, any false advertisement will be presumed to harm 
the competitor. See Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 760 F.3d 247, 260 (2d Cir. 2014). 
34. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2235-36. 
 
the yale law journal 129:2030  2020 
2042 
names only juices that are not predominant in the blend, then it must either de-
clare the percentage content or “[i]ndicate that the named juice is present as a 
flavor or flavoring.”
35
 Minute Maid had done precisely that, stating that its prod-
uct was a “pomegranate blueberry flavored blend of 5 juices.”
36
 The case made it 
all the way to the Supreme Court, which rejected Coca-Cola’s argument. FDA 
regulatory compliance was a different issue than liability to POM under the Lan-
ham Act; the public health and safety regulations did not preempt the possibility 
of a private suit for misleading consumers.
37
 
It is natural to think of marketing law as fundamentally aimed at protecting 
consumers from being misled. But even if such consumer protection determines 
the substantive norms, competitors are empowered to assert their own griev-
ances at violations of those norms.
38
 POM’s complaint was, essentially, “You 
misrepresented things to consumers, and we lost out.” That the suit turned on 
POM’s complaint, not that of consumers, is reflected in the fact that damages 
were based on POM’s losses, not on the magnitude of the injury to consumers 
or society at large.
39
 It is also, interestingly, reflected in the available defenses, 
which may concern the standing of the particular plaintiff—a consideration that 
might seem irrelevant if the injury to consumers were the sole motivation for 
liability. For example, on remand, Coca-Cola was permitted to invoke a defense 
of “unclean hands,” arguing that POM’s own advertising had itself misled con-
sumers about both the content of its juice blends and the health benefits of pom-
egranate juice.
40
 In sum, like interference and exclusivity, marketing, too, can 
generate a grievance particular to the competitor. 
 
35. 21 C.F.R. § 102.33(d)(1) (2019). 
36. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2235 (emphasis added). 
37. Id. at 2237-39. 
38. See id. at 2234 (“Though in the end consumers also benefit from the Act’s proper enforcement, 
the cause of action is for competitors, not consumers.”). 
39. The doctrine has explicitly evolved to excuse plaintiffs from any burden to show actual con-
sumer confusion when the advertisement is deemed “literally false.” See Abbott Labs. v. Mead 
Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 13-14 (7th Cir. 1992). There are even instances in which cases are 
allowed to proceed despite uncontradicted empirical evidence that consumers were not af-
fected. See IDT Telecom, Inc. v. CVT Prepaid Sols., Inc., No. 07-1076, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
120355, at *27-28 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2009) (holding that statements in an advertisement were 
material as a matter of law despite a survey, prepared by the plaintiff, in which only 2 of 401 
respondents described the advertisements as how they “generally decide” and only 3% of con-
sumers surveyed even looked at the advertisements). 




D. Other Misconduct 
In marketing cases, a plaintiff alleges that a competitor gained an illicit ad-
vantage by misleading consumers. But a competitor might gain an illicit ad-
vantage in other ways as well, mistreating not consumers but employees, the 
environment, or the public at large. Consider the facts of one case, recently al-
lowed to proceed and still pending.
41
 Diva Limousine is a California livery cab 
company.
42
 It brought suit against the ride-sharing service Uber, alleging that 
Uber secures unlawful cost savings by misclassifying its drivers as independent 
contractors instead of employees in violation of California labor law. Diva argued 
that, in doing so, Uber takes business and market share from competitors, like 
Diva, that comply with the law.
43
 In denying Uber’s motion to dismiss, the trial 
court explained that California’s unfair competition law “allows competitor suits 
predicated on conduct that . . . significantly threaten[s] or harm[s] competi-




Like the previous examples, Diva’s complaint is intelligible. Diva finds itself 
losing revenue and market share because a competitor is apparently exploiting 
its workers. It is harmed by Uber’s conduct, and it has standing to complain. 
Such a complaint need not imply that California labor law exists in order to pro-
tect companies like Diva. Its substantive norms are shaped to protect employees, 
and it is the employees’ rights that are being violated. But business competitors 
have a particular stake in whether their rivals are gaining an edge by mistreating 
others—be they consumers, employees, or anyone else. It is thus no surprise that 
 
41. Diva Limousine, Ltd. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
42. Id. at 1080. 
43. Id. at 1081. Diva’s suit is styled as a class action on behalf of itself and other providers of pre-
arranged ground-transportation services. Class actions do have a partly public-law structure, 
allowing lead plaintiffs and the attorneys themselves to recover extra compensation for their 
service as something akin to private attorneys general. For my purposes, however, it is irrele-
vant that Diva’s case is a class action. 
44. Id. at 1091. For a similar structure with a different political bent, see Commercial Cleaning 
Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 2001), in which a business was 
held to state a valid claim against a competitor that hired undocumented immigrants, allow-
ing it to underbid other firms. 
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competitors have sued each other for conduct ranging from unlicensed profes-
sional practice
45
 to violating environmental regulations
46
 to money laundering.
47
 
Of course, there are limits on competitors’ standing,
48
 but their ability to bring 
suit at all in such cases suggests a legal recognition of the relation that competi-
tors bear to the misconduct of their rivals. 
E. Competition Law as Private Law 
My aim, in walking through these cases, is to emphasize the structural and 
substantive similarities between them. If we accept that interference is a private 
wrong appropriately redressed by private law, then these competition cases seem 
to involve parties with a similar standing to assert a grievance. The harmed com-
petitor is no mere bystander, nor merely in possession of a complaint shared by 
every other market participant. The legal standing tracks a natural sort of inter-
personal standing. Another way to put this point is to say that competition law, 
in these contexts, is private law—instantiating a justice between the parties.
49
 
And it is, in this way, an instantiation of a moral relation. 
 
45. Law Offices of Mathew Higbee v. Expungement Assistance Servs., 153 Cal. Rprt. 3d 865, 868 
(Ct. App. 2013). 
46. Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 805, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
47. Republic of Colom. v. Diageo N. Am. Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 365, 430-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
48. In particular, standing is often denied on grounds that there is an absence of proximate cause 
or that the injury is not of the kind intended to be covered by the relevant statutory scheme. 
See, e.g., Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006) (denying Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act standing where a competitor allegedly engaged in tax 
fraud); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (denying 
standing because the plaintiff did not suffer an “antitrust injury”). These limitations are, un-
doubtedly, significant constraints on the kind of standing that I am describing. Indeed, while 
sometimes a matter of practicalities and proof, proximate cause is at other times explicitly 
described in terms of limiting standing to violations of a right. I think this is a mistake, though 
I cannot fully defend that claim here. For present purposes, I will note that proximate cause 
is, at best, applied inconsistently and does not always rule out recovery for bare competition 
harm. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (allowing 
recovery for lost sales not attributable directly to the rights violation). Less problematic for 
my purposes, statutory standing requirements are often used simply to police the particular 
mechanism for suit—e.g. to dismiss a claim in antitrust that is more appropriately brought as 
a business tort. This is generally reasonable, especially where state tort law and unfair com-
petition law remain to catch the residual cases. But the boundary policing can strike me as 
overly fixated on arbitrary demarcations. In emphasizing the continuity across competition 
wrongs, I do mean to question the reification of some doctrinal categories. 
49. There are multiple ways of carving up the distinction between private law and public law. See 
Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARV. J.L. 




Many scholars might try to cut off the line that I have drawn from common-
law torts to antitrust and marketing law. They might contend that the standing 
in these latter cases is not moral but artificial. We allow these private lawsuits, 
the thought goes, as a matter of effectuating public-policy objectives. These 
plaintiffs have no moral complaint; they are simply empowered to act as private 
attorneys general. As courts explicitly say, these legal schemes are not meant to 
protect competitors per se, but rather the public at large.
50
 This has generally 
meant a consumer-welfare standard, though that approach has faced more crit-
icism of late.
51
 But, even among the critics of the consumer-welfare standard, it 
is some public concern—with equality or democracy or justice—that should 
shape the law.
52
 Regardless, then, a competitor’s standing looks to be purely in-
strumental: the damages defendants must pay are imposed only to deter conduct 
that harms the public (consumers, workers, etc.), and competitors are allowed 
to recover those damages only to provide them an incentive to bring such suits 
on the public’s behalf. As a matter of classification, this is public law, not private 
law in any deep sense.
53
 Corrective-justice theorists and relational-moral theo-
 
parts of competition law instantiate what Ernest Weinrib calls “the idea of private law.” See 
WEINRIB, supra note 10. 
50. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) 
(“It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection of competition, not com-
petitors.’” (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))); Int’l Order 
of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[O]ur reading of 
the Lanham Act and its legislative history reveals no congressional design to bestow . . . broad 
property rights . . . . Its scope is much narrower: to protect consumers against deceptive des-
ignations of the origin of goods and, conversely, to enable producers to differentiate their 
products from those of others.”); Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194, 
212 (D.D.C. 1989) (“While the [Lanham] Act is not directly available to consumers, it is nev-
ertheless designed to protect consumers, by giving the cause of action to competitors who are 
prepared to vindicate the injury caused to consumers.”). 
51. The consumer-welfare standard is generally traced to ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PAR-
ADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). See, e.g., id. at 7 (“[T]he only legitimate goal of 
antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare.”). For examples of the recent criticism, see 
TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018); Sanjukta Paul, 
Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); and Lina 
M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017). 
52. See, e.g., WU, supra note 51 (advocating for antitrust as a mechanism for addressing economic 
inequality); Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2543, 2544 (2013) (“[A]ntitrust is also public law designed to serve public ends. To-
day’s . . . antitrust enforcement [is] too far away from its democratic roots.”). 
53. Some writers suggest that the realm of private law might even be understood by contrast with 
areas like antitrust. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse De-
fended: A Reply to Posner, Calabresi, Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette, 88 IND. L.J. 569, 606 
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rists might thus try to escape the challenge presented by the above cases by cleav-
ing them off into the admittedly instrumentalist domain of regulation. This is 
simply to endorse the dominant understanding of antitrust itself. 
But I am questioning precisely this widely but unreflectively endorsed as-
sumption that antitrust and marketing law are public law. Its foundation is un-
sound. From the idea that considerations of public protection determine the sub-
stantive legal norms, it need not follow that the injured competitor’s standing to 
complain is simply a policy choice about efficient enforcement. Regardless of the 
substantive norms involved,
54
 there are features of these competition cases that 
strongly suggest treating them as private law, making the domain of private law 
more expansive than typically conceived by high theory. 
Competition wrongs are private—and best conceived as part of private law—
in three important ways.
55
 First, these cases are structured as a drama between 
plaintiff and defendant. One private party initiates a lawsuit with a complaint 
against another private party, who must then respond. The state serves as the 
neutral adjudicator of the dispute; it neither initiates nor controls the course of 
the legal action.
56
 Second, remedies are calculated based on the injury suffered 
 
(2013) (“While there are areas of law that are perhaps best understood on [a model of cost-
effective deterrence]—antitrust law might be one—we have argued that tort law is not.”); 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 50-
52 (1998) (contrasting substantive standing in torts with antitrust standing, understood in 
economic terms). 
54. A competitor may, I will argue, have a personal complaint stemming from more generalized 
misconduct. That is, there may be private wrongs that derive from breach of public-oriented 
norms. But that argument requires the independence claim. 
55. Cf. A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, 
and Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247, 1251 (2005) (arguing that antitrust should 
not be regarded as regulatory); Klass, supra note 28 (manuscript at 5, 18) (identifying four 
characteristics of private law—horizontal duties (which he defines in terms of wronging), 
transfer remedies, private enforcement, and ties to the common law—and concluding that 
“[c]ompetitor suits under the Lanham Act look very much like other private lawsuits and 
might advance the same values”).  
56. This aspect of tort suits is an important feature of rights-based conceptions of private law. See, 
e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 163, 200 (2011) (“Instead of being a matter of either distributive justice or loss allocation, 
corrective justice is concerned with rights governing the ways in which people are permitted 
to use their means in setting and pursuing their purposes . . . . Within this structure, it is not 
merely unsurprising but inevitable that plaintiff alone is entitled to decide whether or not to 
stand on his or her rights in cases of wrongdoing. That is a general feature of a right as be-
tween private parties; the right holder determines whether to enforce it.”); Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 741 (2003) (“A right of action 
is a privilege and a power, and the state is not committed to the normative desirability of its 




by the plaintiff, not the harm suffered by the public. The law is, in this way, 
responding to a private injury. One might object, at this point, that these laws 
often come with treble damages, departing from a purely compensatory meas-
ure.
57
 But treble damages are still damages fundamentally based on the injury 
suffered by the plaintiff, which need not correspond to the amount of harm to 
the public that particular anticompetitive conduct has caused. In reality, treble 
damages may be more truly compensatory than traditional common-law dam-
ages, which typically undercompensate victims significantly.
58
 Furthermore, if 
the presence of treble damages meant that the law is not responding to a wrong 
to the plaintiff, we would have to say that civil-rights cases, too, are not truly 
addressing wrongs done to plaintiffs. As long as the damages are anchored to the 
injury to the plaintiff, the presence of enhancing elements—whether they be tre-
bling or an award of attorney fees or punitive damages—should not produce the 
conclusion that the law is no longer fundamentally concerned with the wrong to 
the plaintiff. Third and finally, as I have tried to suggest, competition law is often 
continuous with paradigmatically private tort law, such as tortious interference. 
The underlying conduct is similar; the relationship between the parties is simi-
lar; the ultimate harm to the plaintiff is similar; our pretheoretical sense of in-
justice is similar. Of course, traditional economic torts have common-law ori-
gins, whereas modern competition law is largely statutory.
59
 But, substantively, 
they involve the same relation between plaintiffs and defendants. 
To see why it is potentially misleading to describe these plaintiffs as private 
attorneys general, consider the contrast with qui tam actions, where this descrip-
tion seems completely apt. In qui tam actions, private parties initiate a lawsuit 
on behalf of the sovereign and the damages are based on the injury to the sover-
eign, with the private plaintiff receiving a share of the recovery for his or her 
trouble.
60
 The private party is acting as an attorney for the public. In American 
 
57. Cf. Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) (contrasting antitrust with business 
torts and expressing an unwillingness to “transform cases involving business behavior that is 
improper for various reasons, say, cases involving nepotism or personal pique, into treble-
damages antitrust cases”). 
58. See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages? 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 
115 (1993). 
59. If this difference were important, it is not clear which way it would cut, given that competition 
statutes, at least in the United States, were drafted in deliberately minimalist ways to allow 
the law to develop in the fashion of common law. See BORK, supra note 51, at 409 (discussing 
the deliberately “open-textured” nature of antitrust laws); William F. Baxter, Separation of 
Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 
661 (1982). 
60. See the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2018), which prohibits fraudulently claim-
ing payment from the U.S. government, id. § 3729(a)(1), and authorizes any person to sue, 
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qui tam actions, the government has the right to take over the case if it believes 
it can better represent the public.
61
 Plaintiffs in competition cases are not private 
attorneys general in this sense.
62
 They are not pointing to an injury to the sov-
ereign but to an injury of their own, and they control the lawsuit, which is keyed 
to their standing to assert their grievance. 
To my mind, it has been a convenient fiction that competition law can be 
cordoned off from the law of private wrongs. It allowed private-law theorists to 
avoid facing the difficulties of rights-based explanations for competition 
wrongs. And it allowed competition law to regard itself as unconcerned with 
interpersonal morality.
63
 And yet, there on its face, the law grants competitors 
the standing—across a range of relatively continuous cases—to go to court, make 
a complaint, and seek compensatory damages for injuries they have sustained 
from their competitors’ misconduct. 
i i .  the independence claim 
The second half of my thesis is that competition wrongs do not depend on 
any underlying right of the wronged party. That is, though parties may have 
special standing to complain about illicit competition, this is not because of some 
right that they hold. This is a negative argument, so the natural way to proceed 
is by cataloguing and rebutting possible rights-based explanations. 
Before wading into the details, however, let me say something about the gen-
eral form of the argument. A successful rights-based explanation should do at 
least two things, and hopefully a third as well. First, it should describe a right 
 
on behalf of the government, for violations of that prohibition, id. § 3730(b)(1). Should the 
suit be successful, damages are assessed at triple the injury suffered by the government, plus 
a statutory penalty, id. § 3729(a)(1), and the plaintiff is entitled to a portion of the proceeds 
depending on the extent to which he contributed to the recovery, id. § 3730(d). 
61. The complaint must be served initially on the government, giving it at least sixty days to elect 
whether to intervene and take over the action, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), in which case the action 
may be settled or dismissed by the government regardless of the initiating party’s objections, 
id. § 3730(c)(2). The government is at all times the named plaintiff, and the action can be 
dismissed only with the consent of the government. Id. § 3730(b)(1). Even if the government 
elects not to take over the action, it retains rights to intervene later or to stay discovery. Id. 
§ 3730(c)(3)-(4). 
62. A much better comparison, discussed infra Part III, is the tort of public nuisance, which is 
generally regarded as a sort of anomalous form of private law. I am suggesting that it is not 
anomalous at all. 
63. Although hardly the main aim of this paper, I hope that reconceptualizing competition law as 
not strictly and exclusively public law may provide new resources and avenues for critique of 
the dominant antitrust paradigm. Antitrust law, on this view, may be partly about ensuring 
that we can potentially hold one another accountable for our public conduct—that such ac-
countability relations are part of being free and equal coparticipants in a market. 
competition wrongs 
2049 
uniquely held by the wronged party. Second, this right should have some inde-
pendently meaningful function, guiding or structuring our normative life in 
some way beyond simply identifying wrongs. Finally, the right should offer a 
plausible qualitative characterization of what has been lost when the wrong oc-
curs. Consider an example. You wrong me if you break into my house. An expla-
nation of this wrong might plausibly appeal to my property right in my house. 
The property right is uniquely mine, so it can explain why I am wronged and my 
neighbor is not. And the property right is independently meaningful. Ex ante, it 
delineates my house as a sphere in which I have control—I can exclude you, give 
you permission, and so forth. Moreover, the right potentially figures in explana-
tions of the reasons that others have for acting; the fact that it is mine might be 
a reason why you should not light it on fire. Finally, the deprivation of my sov-
ereignty over my house seems to offer a plausible description of the nature and 
magnitude of the wrong involved in breaking in. 
My argument is that there is no rights-based explanation of competition 
harms that can succeed in these ways. The potential rights to which one might 
appeal either do not exist, or, if they do, they fail to satisfy these criteria, by being 
either too diffuse to explain the distinctive wrong to the competitor, and thus 
failing the first criterion, or too empty to offer any meaningful explanation, and 
thus failing one of the final two criteria. 
A. A Right to Ownership or Control 
Along the lines of breaking into a house, a first possible explanation for com-
petition wrongs is that they involve the violation of a proprietary right of one’s 
competitor. Tortious interference with contract is often understood in terms of a 
party’s having a property interest in its contractual relations.
64
 Marketing law 
can seem to protect commercial parties’ rights to their reputation.
65
 One might 
think that competition wrongs are thus straightforwardly related to the rights of 
market participants in that they are forms of theft or conversion. 
Analogizing to property in this way is tempting because, as I have been em-
phasizing, rivals harmed by unfair competition do seem uniquely wronged: 
something of theirs appears to have been taken from them. In order to see how 
 
64. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Cottman Transmission Sys., LLC, 754 S.E.2d 313, 321 (Va. 2014) (“[Tor-
tious] interference is directed at and injures a property right, i.e., the right to performance of 
a contract and to reap profits and benefits not only from the contract but also from expected 
future contracts or otherwise advantageous business relationships.”). 
65. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 781-82 (1992) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (describing a dual purpose behind the Lanham Act). 
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far this approach might reach, consider a famous Supreme Court case: Interna-
tional News Service v. Associated Press.
66
 The Associated Press (AP) was the dom-
inant news-gathering organization in the United States.
67
 The International 
News Service (INS) was a competing news organization about half the size of 
the AP, mostly composed of newspapers belonging to the Hearst media empire.
68
 
During World War I, the INS began taking AP stories from AP bulletins or early 
Eastern editions and selling them to INS newspapers that ran them, sometimes 
verbatim.
69
 Historical records suggest that the INS resorted to this tactic because 
the British and French had cut INS personnel from the front lines and denied 
the INS access to European telegraph cables due to its publication of material 
strongly sympathetic with the German cause in the war.
70
 Without other direct 
access to the news of the war, the INS simply took the AP’s material.
71
 The AP 
brought suit, alleging unfair competition. 
The case illustrates the outer bounds of what a property-like right might 
conceivably explain. In quite moralized terms, the Supreme Court ruled in favor 
of the AP, suggesting that the INS was “appropriating to itself the harvest of 
those who have sown.”
72
 But a precise rationale was hard to pinpoint. The news 
is public information. I commit no wrong by telling you about what I learned 
from the New York Times this morning. The Court evaded this difficulty by clev-
erly declaring that the news should be regarded as “quasi property”: although 
the news was not property with regard to the public, it might be regarded as 




66. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
67. Id. at 248-49 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For further historical details about the case, see Rich-
ard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of 
Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 90-94 (1992). 
68. Epstein, supra note 67, at 91. 
69. Id. at 91-92. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 94-95. 
72. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 239-40. 
73. Id. at 236 (“[A]lthough we may and do assume that neither party has any remaining property 
interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its first pub-
lication, it by no means follows that there is no remaining property interest in it as between 
themselves. For, to both of them alike, news matter, however little susceptible of ownership 
or dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, 
organization, skill, labor, and money, and to be distributed and sold to those who will pay 
money for it, as for any other merchandise. Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material 
out of which both parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same field, 
we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded 




That is, as between competitors, what had been sown by one would be regarded 
as property against the others, even though it was not actually subject to true 
ownership. This peculiar doctrine, which has come to be known as the tort of 
“hot-news misappropriation,” continues to rear its head occasionally in contexts 
from basketball statistics
74
 to stock recommendations
75
 to celebrity gossip.
76
 It 
allows courts to hold liable a party that systematically exploits the hard work of 
its competitor. This property-based explanation is tempting because, if true, it 
would tether the wrong to something independently significant: a right that the 
AP had ex ante. 
But the language of “quasi-property” is elusive. As Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis noted in dissenting opinions, it can be misleading to say that anyone 
holds a property right in the news.
77
 The worry is that by trying to conjure an 
independently significant entitlement—a property right—the opinion gives too 
much. Even if there is a wrong here, it cannot be explained in this way without 
unacceptably granting powers of ownership that we are not prepared to grant. 
As a result, property-law scholars have typically tried to ground the misappro-
priation doctrine in some other way.
78
 
I am agnostic as to whether International News Service was correctly de-
cided.
79
 For the present purposes, what is important is the natural limitation of 
a property-based explanation. To say that a party has a property-like right is 
strong medicine. It entails meaningful powers—the incidents of ownership—
beyond the ability to assert a wrong. Perhaps it is plausible that, as between each 
other, the AP and INS could engage in practices paradigmatic of ownership, such 
 
74. NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997). 
75. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 2011). 
76. X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
77. See, e.g., Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that property is 
about exclusion, i.e. control, not about whether another reaps value); id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others 
from enjoying it. . . . But the fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money and 
labor, and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to ensure to it this 
legal attribute of property.”). 
78. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 94-102; Henry E. Smith, Equitable Intellectual Property: What’s 
Wrong with Misappropriation?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 42, 54-55, 
57-58 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The 
Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 444 (2011) (suggesting that the 
misappropriation principle originated to combat the free-rider problem); Michael E. Kenne-
ally, Misappropriation and the Morality of Free-Riding, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 289, 290-91 
(2015) (same). 
79. For a defense of the property-based account of International News Service, see generally Chris 
Essert, Property in the Market (Nov. 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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as excluding the other from using a piece of news or, alternatively, granting per-
mission to print it. Perhaps they could even plausibly buy and sell stories from 
one another. To the extent that we are willing to accept that such relations could 
exist between two parties, the quasi-property explanation may be correct.
80
 But 
the news presses the boundaries of what we might conceivably subject to such 
ownership, even if only between two parties. 
Such an explanation would seem to be a complete nonstarter for other com-
petition wrongs. One does not have even quasi-property in one’s consumers, ad-
vertisers, suppliers, workers, or market share.
81
 And yet the loss of these things 
seems to be precisely the subject of paradigmatic competition wrongs. For ex-
ample, Berkey’s contention was that Kodak wronged it by excluding it from the 
flash technology of Kodak’s suppliers. But it would strain all bounds of coher-
ence to say that Berkey had a quasi-property right in a potential supply agree-
ment with, say, GE. Berkey had no entitlement to exclude Kodak from dealing 
with GE or to grant Kodak permission to deal with GE in the way that the AP 
might arguably have had an entitlement to deny or grant INS permission to print 
a news story. Or consider POM’s objection to Coca-Cola’s marketing. Even if we 
could describe Coca-Cola as misappropriating POM’s customers or the carefully 
cultivated reputation of pomegranate juice, it would be implausible to say that 
POM had even a quasi-property right to its customers or to the reputation of 
pomegranate juice. POM could hardly object if Coca-Cola had taken POM’s cus-
tomers or traded on the reputation of pomegranate juice by selling actual pom-
egranate juice. Nor could POM grant Coca-Cola permission to mislead in the 




80. For an illuminating discussion of how quasi-property rights might be used to explain tortious 
interference with contract, see Peter Benson, The Basis for Excluding Liability for Economic Loss 
in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 427, 455-457 (David G. Owen ed., 
1995). Benson’s explanation is plausible precisely because contracts are transferred to third 
parties by way of assignment, which suggests their property-like status. 
81. One might say that many of the failures of early-twentieth-century American law stemmed 
from its being too willing to grant quasi-property rights over contracts and workers. See, e.g., 
KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 79-91 (1991) (describing the persistence of property-like treatment of work-
ers); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (arguing that the 
Lochner era’s mistake was not judicial activism but a conception of economic entitlements as 
naturally held). For an interesting discussion of the connection between modern antitrust and 
this property-like orientation to market activity, see Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil as Lochner’s 
Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783 (2012). 
82. This should be contrasted with the possibility that POM might have waived its potential legal 
action. But waiving a potential complaint is not the same as granting permission. See Nicolas 




In a way, the quasi-property explanation offers an illustration of the kind of 
right that could fill out a rights-based explanation for competition wrongs. It 
fulfills the criteria mentioned earlier: it would be a right particular to the victim, 
and it would tie the wrong to some antecedent relation between the parties that 
meaningfully structured their duties and powers with respect to each other in 
additional contexts other than the competition wrong itself. But, although it is 
the correct kind of explanation, it fails for another reason. Whether plausible in 
INS v. AP or not, such an explanation cannot generalize to most competition 
wrongs. When competitors like Kodak or POM are wronged, it is not explicable 
in terms of a quasi-property right. If we are to explain such wrongs, we must 
look elsewhere. 
B. Two Ideas of Fair Play 
Some scholars have suggested that the wrong committed by INS is better 
understood as free riding than theft.
83
 Free riding might seem a more promising 
path forward in explaining competition wrongs more generally. In particular, it 
might seem that competitors have either a right that competitors refrain from 
free riding or, relatedly, a right that competitors abide by the rules of the com-
petition. These ideas are frequently and naturally connected: a norm against free 
riding may be invoked to explain the obligation to comply with rules of a shared 
activity. This idea gets referred to as the principle of fair play. 
The principle of fair play is often traced to H.L.A. Hart, who argued that 
“when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and 
thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when 
required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by 
their submission.”
84
 John Rawls temporarily picked up on this idea, giving it the 
name “fair play” while dropping any reference to rights.
85
 Since Rawls, an inter-
mittently lively debate has persisted as to whether the principle of fair play can 
 
83. See Balganesh, supra note 78, at 429 (“If hot news misappropriation is to survive as a viable 
doctrine, then rooting it in a theory of competitive unjust enrichment directed at solving a 
collective action problem seems unavoidable. . . . Hot news misappropriation did not and can-
not create a property right in news.”); Kenneally, supra note 78. 
84. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 185 (1955). 
85. John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3 (Sidney Hook 
ed., 1964). Here is how Rawls actually described the principle: 
The principle of fair play may be defined as follows. Suppose there is a mutually 
beneficial and just scheme of social cooperation, and that the advantages it yields 
can only be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperates. Suppose further 
that cooperation requires a certain sacrifice from each person, or at least involves a 
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The notion of fair play is evocative, but two different ideas should be distin-
guished. First, one idea of fair play—perhaps truer to the name but more de-
tached from the existing literature—would be that, specifically in competitive 
contexts, competitors have a right that other competitors not gain an unfair ad-
vantage by disregarding the rules of that competition. The thought here is that 
each competitor has a right that other competitors abide by the rules because, if 
they do not, then the complying participants will be at a disadvantage. Partici-
pants have a right against illicit gains because those gains necessarily constitute 
an injury to them, given the zero-sum nature of competitive success. I will refer 
to this proposal as based on a competitor’s right to rule compliance. 
Alternatively, you might think that by benefitting from a cooperative enter-
prise—in particular, benefitting from others’ compliance with the rules of the 
enterprise—you acquire a duty to comply with the rules of that enterprise. On 
this picture, it is not essential that the other participants are harmed by your 
noncompliance. They have a right to your reciprocal compliance in virtue of hav-
ing conveyed a benefit upon you by their compliance. It is this idea that has re-
ceived the most philosophical focus.
87
 Hart aside, it is not typically framed in 
terms of rights. Still, we might think that it could offer a rights-based explana-
tion of competition wrongs. I will refer to this proposal as based on a contributor’s 
right to fair contribution. 
In what follows, I will suggest that neither of these proposed rights can 
ground the competition wrongs that are my focus. I will start with the more 
specific idea that competitors have a right that fellow competitors abide by the 
rules of their competition, and then turn to the broader idea that participants in 
 
certain restriction of his liberty. Suppose finally that the benefits produced by co-
operation are, up to a certain point, free: that is, the scheme of cooperation is un-
stable in the sense that if any one person knows that all (or nearly all) of the others 
will continue to do their part, he will still be able to share a gain from the scheme 
even if he does not do his part. Under these conditions a person who has accepted 
the benefits of the scheme is bound by a duty of fair play to do his part and not to 
take advantage of the free benefit by not cooperating. The reason one must abstain 
from this attempt is that the existence of the benefit is the result of everyone’s effort, 
and prior to some understanding as to how it is to be shared, if it can be shared at 
all, it belongs in fairness to no one. 
  Id. at 9-10. 
86. See generally Richard Dagger & David Lefkowitz, Political Obligation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. § 4.3 (Fall 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-obligation/#FaiPla 
[https://perma.cc/R9CD-H4Y9] (summarizing the debate). 




any cooperative scheme have a right to contribution from those who benefit from 
the scheme. 
C. The Competitor’s Right to Rule Compliance 
It is natural to think that competitors have a right that fellow competitors 
abide by the rules of the competition. If we are rivals in a race, I may have a right 
that you not jump the gun. By analogy, a business may appear to have a right 
that its competitors not engage in tactics that violate the rules of the market. In 
both cases, one party would be put at a comparative disadvantage or would have 
their legitimate expectations violated by the noncompliance of their competitor. 
This explanation analogizes the market to a game or a sporting contest. And 
many philosophical discussions of competition take sports or games as the start-
ing point.
88
 Dworkin, one will recall, starts with the metaphor of swimmers 
competing in their own separate lanes.
89
 
Sometimes competitors do seem to have a right that rivals abide by the rules, 
especially in the context of games and sports. If we are playing a board game and 
you are not following the rules, I am entitled to draw attention to this failure and 
demand that you correct it. Assuming that you are indeed breaking the rules, 
you owe it to me to bring your play into compliance. One can see how such a 
right to compliance might be grounded by imagining a dialogue. I might draw 
your attention to the written rules and point out that, in agreeing to play the 
game together, we agreed with each other to abide by these rules. “Look, this is the 
rule of the game and you committed to playing this game with me.” There are 
two elements here: established rules and mutual commitment among competi-
tors to be bound by those rules.
90
 When both are present, then competitors may 
indeed have a right to each other’s compliance. 
I want to suggest, however, that competition wrongs are not typically cap-
tured by such rights. In particular, I believe that a competitor’s right to rule com-
pliance would be both under- and overinclusive as an explanation of competition 
wrongs as they occur in real life. In making this argument, I consciously aim to 
move away from the analogy to sports and games. Games are highly artificial. 
An all-too-tempting idea about business is that business constitutes its own 
 
88. See, e.g., John McMurtry, How Competition Goes Wrong, 8 J. APPLIED PHIL. 201 (1991) (taking 
ice hockey as a model of thinking about competition and its pathologies). 
89. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
90. For an intriguing recent suggestion that all rights are grounded in joint commitment, see 
MARGARET GILBERT, RIGHTS AND DEMANDS: A FOUNDATIONAL INQUIRY (2018). 
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game—a game that, like poker, admits of some conduct that would be imper-
missible in ordinary life.
91
 But the market is not a game. Games are typically 
characterized by well-codified rules, mutually accepted by all competitors upon 
a demarcated entry, and artificial game-specific objectives.
92
 The market, though 
socially constructed, is not artificially designed in this way. Rather, the market is 
built out of, and continuous with, ordinary life. While we may not always be in 
the market, neither is it something that one cleanly enters and exits like a poker 
game or a swim race. And we are not “players” with artificial ends; we are real 
people with true interests.
93
 While competition wrongs in games may often be 
understood in terms of claiming a right to compliance with some established 
rule, that model fits the competition wrongs of real life much less well. 
First, the wrongs that arise from illicit competition outside of games and 
sport are not limited to competitors who have entered into the same competition 
and thereby share some implied agreement or joint commitment. The idea that 
there is a right that competitors abide by the rules seems most plausible as a right 
of direct competitors—the board gamers who sit down at the table together or 
the swimmers who simultaneously approach the starting blocks. By opting into 
the activity together, the competitors mutually commit to be bound by the rules 
of that competition. Consider the Court’s logic in International News Service: 
among those who opt to gather news, a special set of rules implicitly applies.
94
 
The advantage of such an explanation is that it potentially explains why the right 
is limited to just those within a particular competition. The AP has a right 
against INS because they are engaged in the same activity, like board gamers at 
the table together or swimmers in the same race. 
And yet competition wrongs spill out beyond direct competitors. A recent 
Supreme Court case illustrates this point.
95
 Lexmark, which makes laser printers 
and toner cartridges, designed its printers so that they could use only cartridges 
that Lexmark itself had also made.
96
 Although competitors therefore could not 
manufacture their own cartridges for use in Lexmark printers, they could resell 
refurbished, used Lexmark cartridges in competition with Lexmark’s own, new 
 
91. See Albert Z. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1968, at 143, 145. 
92. For the definitive discussion of games and their connection with artificial constraints, see BER-
NARD SUITS, THE GRASSHOPPER: GAMES, LIFE AND UTOPIA (1978). 
93. For the idea that players’ ends in games are systematically different, see the discussion of “dis-
posable ends” in C. Thi Nguyen, Competition as Cooperation, 44 J. PHIL. SPORT 123, 124-27 
(2017). 
94. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918). 
95. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). 






 Such competitors are called “remanufacturers.”
98
 Static Control was 
“the market leader [in] making and selling the components necessary to reman-
ufacture Lexmark cartridges.”
99
 In an effort to prevent remanufacturers from ac-
quiring used cartridges, Lexmark gave customers a discount, or “prebate,” on 
new cartridges in exchange for agreeing, through a shrinkwrap license at the 
time of purchase, to return the used cartridge to Lexmark.
100
 In addition, 
Lexmark redesigned the cartridge so that once it was empty it would cease work-
ing until an embedded microchip was replaced by Lexmark.
101
 Static Control 
developed a microchip that remanufacturers could use in lieu of Lexmark’s chip 
to reactivate used cartridges.
102
 Lexmark sued for copyright infringement, and 
Static Control counterclaimed for Lanham Act violations.
103
 Static Control’s 
counterclaim was that Lexmark had engaged in a campaign to “‘purposefully 
mislead[] end-users’ to believe that they are legally bound . . . to return the Pre-
bate-labeled cartridge to Lexmark after a single use.”
104
 In short, it was the sup-
plier of the remanufacturers, Static Control, that brought a complaint alleging 
that Lexmark was lying to consumers about remanufacturers. 
The trial court initially denied Static Control standing, holding that its injury 
was “remot[e]” because it was a mere “byproduct of the supposed manipulation 
of consumers’ relationships with remanufacturers” and noting that there were 
“more direct plaintiffs in the form of remanufacturers of Lexmark’s car-
tridges.”
105
 But the Supreme Court, which has been highly reluctant to open its 
door to plaintiffs,
106
 concluded that Static Control did have standing to bring its 
suit even though it was not Lexmark’s direct competitor. As the Court put it, 
“competition is not required for proximate cause; and that is true even if the 
defendant’s aim was to harm its immediate competitors, and the plaintiff merely 
 
97. Id. at 121. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 




103. Id. at 122; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018) (creating a private cause of action). 
104. Id. at 122-23 (quoting Joint Appendix ¶ 39, at 31, Lexmark, 572 U.S. 118 (No. 12-873), 2013 WL 
4407060, at *31). 
105. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., Nos. 02-571, 04-84, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 73845, at *39 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2006). 
106. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
563 US. 333 (2011); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 397 (2007). 
 




 At least in the marketing context, potential plain-
tiffs are not limited to direct competitors.
108
 
Morally speaking, this conclusion is unavoidable. If a business engages in 
misleading marketing tactics, others beyond the business’s direct competitors 
may be injured. One might protest that injuries to downstream parties like a 
supplier are merely indirect. But it is hard to maintain a meaningful distinction 
between direct competitors and other market actors. First, as the Court noted, 
“In a sense, of course, all commercial injuries from false advertising are derivative 
of those suffered by consumers who are deceived by the advertising.”
109
 Thus, to 
say that any competitor is wronged by illegitimate marketing tactics, one must 
be willing to accept that some indirect injuries are wrongs. Moreover, to echo an 
earlier point, one cannot cleanly delineate who is, and is not, within a particular 
competition. For example, the Lexmark decision has recently been applied to pre-
vent Uber from dismissing a false advertising lawsuit brought by various taxi 
companies.
110
 Uber argued that it was just a technology company and therefore 
not a direct competitor to the taxi companies.
111
 Surely such categorization is 
irrelevant. A market actor is wronged when another party engages in illegitimate 
tactics that undermine the actor’s business—whether technically a direct com-
petitor or not.
112
 So a competitor’s right to rule compliance will fail to capture 
the many competition wrongs that do not occur between direct competitors. 
One might respond by expanding the relevant joint activity to include all 
market participants. But then it will look like the noncompliance of any market 
actor wrongs every other market actor—for instance, underhanded tactics of 
 
107. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 138. 
108. The Lexmark decision marks an interesting contrast with the Court’s antitrust jurisprudence, 
where standing has been limited to those directly injured and denied to parties downstream 
in the supply chain. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The somewhat arbitrary 
nature of this rule is exposed in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019), which allowed 
customers of Apple’s app store standing to sue despite the fact that prices were set by app 
developers, making the customers functionally akin to indirect purchasers. Both opinions in 
the case are compelling and yet faltering because the case pits the pragmatic and theoretical 
foundations of the Illinois Brick rule against one another. 
109. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133. 
110. Yellow Grp. LLC v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 12 C 7967, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94093, at *9-10 
(N.D. Ill. July 10, 2014). 
111. Id. at *8. 
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Aaronson, No. 6:17-cv-1394-Orl-37DCI, 2018 WL 735627, (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2018), in which 
a timeshare developer sued a law firm for false advertising because the firm was soliciting 
timeshare members and offering them legal services to free them from their financial obliga-




Lexmark would wrong an unrelated fast-food chain.
113
 Retreating, one might 
insist that some appropriately broad category could exist—say, direct competi-
tors and quasi-competitors (like Static Control). But the problem here is not 
merely a problem of line drawing, though there certainly is that difficulty. The 
deeper problem is that, for the explanation to work, the group must consist of 
actors reciprocally engaged in some collective activity, involving a shared com-
mitment to the rules, such that each is entitled to hold the others to account. If 
Static Control has a right to compliance from Lexmark, then Lexmark has a right 
to compliance from Static Control. Such reciprocity follows from the idea of a 
shared commitment. But my claim is that, in many cases, the potential wrongs 
do not have this reciprocal character. There will be asymmetries, in which one 
party has a stake in the other’s compliance and not vice versa. For example, 
though Static Control could complain against Lexmark’s misleading marketing 
to customers, it is hard to see why Lexmark could complain if Static Control had 
engaged in misleading marketing to its customers (the remanufacturers). The 
difficulty is thus not merely that wrongs spill over onto noncompetitors, but ra-
ther that wrongs spill outside whatever nontotal grouping one posits. That’s be-
cause wrongs track causal relations—whose conduct in fact affects whom—with 
all their organic complexity. 
Even if one could satisfactorily define a group of quasi-competitors recipro-
cally owing compliance, a second, reverse problem exists as well: overinclusivity. 
If competition wrongs were generally grounded in a right that competitors abide 
by the rules, then competition wrongs would arise whether the rule breaker 
gains an advantage over the other party or not. But, at least in market contexts, 
it would be odd to think that I suffer a wrong when my competitor breaks the 
rule in a way that is not to my detriment. Notice the contrast with games here. I can 
potentially complain when my board game companion violates the rules, regard-
less of whether it is to her advantage. She is breaching the terms of our agreed-
upon and shared activity. It strikes me as less plausible that a swimmer can com-
plain if her rival wears a noncompliant suit that actually impairs performance, 
but perhaps she can.
114
 A business, however, surely would not have grounds to 
complain if its competitor engages in ill-conceived misleading advertisements or 
price-fixing schemes that serve only to drive the competitor itself into the 
 
113. For further discussion of such a widespread right, see infra Section II.D. 
114. David Owens offers an interesting discussion of whether a competitor might be wronged by 
the poor effort of a rival. See DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 29-31 
(2012). The idea that competitors are wronged even by counterproductive rule violations 
seems to have an intuitive grip when the noncompliance threatens the integrity of the activity. 
But I can only make this out insofar as there is a harm—it tarnishes what the winner accom-
plishes. 
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ground. The idea of undermining a shared activity—so plausible for the board 
gamers—hardly seems plausible here. 
There are two possible responses. On the one hand, one might insist that 
competitors are indeed wronged, albeit harmlessly, by even the ineffective non-
compliance of their rivals. These are cases of harmless trespass. This response 
strikes me as the appropriate response for one who thinks that there is a right at 
play here.
115
 But, as just noted, it strikes me as implausible in the market context. 
On the other hand, one might retreat to the idea that competitors have a right 
not to be disadvantaged by the noncompliance of a rival. But that seems to name 
an injury rather than something one can claim. It backs off the idea that my com-
petitors owe it to me to abide by the rules where what is owed names some con-
duct to which I am entitled ex ante. I fear that a right like this is really only a 
placeholder, serving no independent function. It thus fails the second of the 
three criteria, and possibly the third as well. It does not describe to anyone what 
counts as within their sphere of control. If what we want from a right is a de-
marcation of what counts as my space—my swimming lane, to use Dworkin’s 
metaphor—then something outcome-dependent will not serve this purpose. 
D. The Contributor’s Right to Fair Contribution 
One might, at this point, consider abandoning the idea that a right to fair 
play is specific to competitors and to rules governing competitive activity. In-
stead of thinking about fair play in terms of not illicitly placing rivals at a com-
petitive disadvantage, one might instead think of it in terms of not taking bene-
fits to which others have contributed without contributing oneself. This 
conception of fair play hews closer to concerns with free riding. In the political-
obligation literature, the duty of fair play typically refers to this notion of not 
benefitting without contributing.
116
 Competition wrongs might then seem to 
consist in gaining benefits from a competition—such as a market for one’s 
goods—that one has not properly earned through compliance with the rules or 
practices that sustain the competition. 
In at least some contexts, there does seem to be a duty to contribute to a 
scheme of cooperation from which one accepts benefits. Whether this duty can 
 
115. For a strong view that one has a complaint against even harmless conduct, see Rahul Kumar, 
Who Can Be Wronged?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 99, 103 (2003). 




generalize enough to ground political obligation across the board is quite con-
troversial.
117
 But, for present purposes, I will assume that there is a broad duty 
to contribute to cooperative schemes from which one derives a benefit, including 
the laws of the market.
118
 I want to argue that, even assuming a general duty not 
to benefit without contributing, competition wrongs are not explained by a right 
that others comply with this duty. 
First, consider whether there is a private right to fair contribution. If there 
is, then it is a right held by a lot of people. Virtually everyone contributes, in one 
way or another, to making our market economy possible and thereby making 
possible the gains of market actors. Even if we were to limit our focus to those 
who refrain from committing violations of competition law itself, which seems 
insufficiently narrow, that is still a terribly large class of actors. It would be odd 
to say that each of these actors has a right to the compliance of all others. 
We typically think of a right as something that one can claim.
119
 Can those 
who contribute to a cooperative scheme make a claim on those who have bene-
fitted? Perhaps collectively they can.
120
 But it is strained to say contributors have 
individual claims. I pay my taxes and you should pay yours, but I do not think 
that I have a personal claim that you pay your taxes. Ben & Jerry’s does not com-
mit antitrust violations and Microsoft should not either, but I do not know that 
Ben & Jerry’s therefore has a right that Microsoft abide by antitrust law. If there 
are such rights, they are weak and diffuse. 
Such ostensible rights—broadly and probably collectively held—seem un-
suited to explain the wrongs that arise in the course of competition. They are too 
generalized and too detached from particular injuries. They thus fail the first 
criterion offered for a successful rights-based explanation. What is sought is a 
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118. There is an initial worry here. Any account of fair play may seem to rely on the idea—which I 
criticized above—that there are determinate rules of the marketplace. Can one free ride when 
the convention in question is not well established? Can I contribute to a system of rules that 
is, at best, inchoate? Again, I think that it is a mistake to think of there being some determinate 
set of “rules of the market” that are wholly apart from the rules of morality more generally. 
119. See Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243, 249 (1970). 
120. I am inclined to think that some of the dispute about the duty of fair play turns on this ques-
tion of whether there is a correlative right in the contributors. In Nozick’s famous example of 
the neighborhood entertainment system, see supra note 117, at 93-94, my intuition is that the 
beneficiary ought to do her part, at least insofar as she has not explicitly disavowed the benefit. 
I think that the force of Nozick’s argument lies, however, in the fact that the others do not 
have a right to demand that she contribute. She ought to, but they cannot claim it from her. 
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right that grounds the distinctive wrong suffered by competitors. A general right 
that others abide by the rules would not explain the wrong as committed against 
a particular party. Insofar as the complaint is that the competitor gains without 
paying the dues paid by everyone else in the cooperative scheme, then everyone 
else in the cooperative scheme must be similarly wronged by the free rider. A 
fast-food joint would suffer the same rights violation as the taxicabs when Uber 
breaks the rules. Even if there might be some sense in which this were true, it 
cannot be the basis for a distinctive wrong suffered by the disadvantaged compet-
itor.
121
 And that is what is needed. It was the sense that the wrong consists in the 
deprivation of business that led to the earlier temptation to characterize the 
wrong in property-like terms.
122




One can see the problem another way relating more to the third criterion for 
a rights-based explanation: a right to fair contribution mischaracterizes the na-
ture of the wrong. If the wrong is grounded in a violation of a right that others 
pay their share for the benefits they receive, then the wrong should be character-
ized by unpaid contribution or by the wrongful gain. The appropriate remedy 
would be a kind of disgorgement of profits.
124
 But competition wrongs are, at 
least in part, about the losses imposed on competitors. Consider an example. 
Minute Maid took advantage of consumer trust in commercial representations. 
Its misleading labels might, in this way, be characterized as free riding or as tak-
ing advantage of a cooperative scheme without contributing. But suppose that 
 
121. Compare the ways that citizens are not granted standing to assert generalized grievances. See 
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992). This standing doctrine is sometimes 
put in terms of what it is to have a right. See id. at 578 (“‘Individual rights’ . . . do not mean 
public rights that have been legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual who forms 
part of the public.” (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944))). 
122. See supra Section II.B. 
123. There is a parallel here to a familiar philosophical problem for convention-based accounts of 
promising: if the wrong consists in the violation of a convention in the abstract, then it looks 
like no one is specially situated to complain. But the present suggestion is worse off than the 
conventional account of promising. At least it is clear that the person who makes a false prom-
ise deliberately avails herself of a determinate convention to which she then does not contrib-
ute. But, in the case of a competitor, it may be less clear that there is a determinate convention 
(i.e., rules of the market) or that she is deliberately availing herself of it. In sum, the present 
suggestion is vulnerable to the familiar problems with conventional accounts of promising, 
plus problems associated with establishing what the convention might be, plus the familiar 
problems about whether there can be a duty of fair play without intentional acceptance. 
124. The Lanham Act does, in fact, allow for disgorgement of profits. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) 




its gains were small, far less than POM stood to lose.
125
 Is the wrong to POM 
correctly characterized merely in terms of Minute Maid’s small gain? I think not. 
The wrong consists, at least in part, in the profits that POM lost. And that sug-
gests that the wrong is not merely that of unfairly reaping a benefit.
126
 
E. Other Possible Rights 
I have now discussed and ruled out what I take to be the most plausible can-
didates for a right that would ground competition wrongs. As such, I hope to 
have made out a prima facie case for the independence claim. But negative argu-
ments always have a tinge of incompleteness. One could certainly propose other 
candidate rights. One might point to a right to one’s legitimate expectations, or 
a right to compete on equal terms, or perhaps a right to sell one’s labor and prod-
ucts in the market. 
I think that these suggestions are either nonstarters, or else they will collapse 
into one of the previously considered options. We do not have a legitimate ex-
pectation that we will keep our customers or our profits. What we might have is 
a legitimate expectation that others will follow the rules. But that then collapses 
into the earlier thought that there is a right that others abide by some set of rules. 
Similarly, we do not generally have a right to compete on equal terms in the 
market. A small startup hardly competes on equal footing with Comcast or 
Google, nor does it have a right to such equal footing. It might have a right to 
compete on formally equal terms. That is, perhaps competitors have a right to 
compete on equal terms where that means a right that all participants are subject 
to the same rules. That right seems, in the first instance, to be a right against the 
state, and not a right against the competitor. Insofar as it is a right against a 
competitor, then it seems to be simply a version of a right to fair play. 
One surely does not have a claim-right to sell one’s labor or goods in the 
market.
127
 Nobody wrongs you by not purchasing what you offer. Perhaps one 
has a liberty-right to sell one’s goods, but the illicit competitor does not violate 
 
125. To make this concrete, suppose that the appearance of Minute Maid’s pomegranate “flavored” 
juice on the shelf induces customers who otherwise would have purchased POM to be con-
fused and simply purchase nothing at all. When this happens, Minute Maid does not benefit, 
but it does harm POM. 
126. As in Section III.C., one might reply to the arguments in this Section by interpreting the right 
as not merely a right to fair contribution, but rather as a right against being harmed by non-
contribution. My response here would be similar. Such a right would appear to serve merely 
as a placeholder. 
127. For the definition of a claim-right, see Leif Weinar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. § 2.1.2 
(Fall 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#2.1 [https://perma.cc/T8Z9-H7PE]. 
 




 Any suggestion in this vicinity must be that one has a claim-right 
to a kind of institution, a fair market in which to sell one’s goods. But this again 
seems to be a broad public right. 
There is a reason why the various explanations gravitate in similar ways and 
then fall victim to similar problems. On the one hand, one wants an explanation 
that describes some unique entitlement of the wronged competitor. This will 
tend toward something like a property right, a meaningful ex ante entitlement. 
But such an explanation will, as we have seen, give too much to the competitor. 
Competitors do not have property-like rights to their customers or their profits 
or the like. On the other hand, one might appeal to a weaker, more general right 
to compliance or fair conduct by others. But that will give too little, offering the 
direct competitor nothing that distinguishes it from everyone else in the market. 
A right that is narrow enough to capture the distinctive wrong will be too strong; 
a right that is more general will be too weak. The recurrent problem, in other 
words, is that the duties seem general and public, but the grievances seem par-
ticular and private. 
i i i .  competition wrongs as unjustifiable harming 
At this point, I hope to have sketched a case for two claims. First, market 
participants have a special standing to complain that they have been wronged 
when they lose business as a result of illegitimate tactics by other market actors. 
And, second, this wrong cannot be explained in terms of some right held by 
competitors ex ante. What, then, is a competition wrong if it is not a violation of 
the competitor’s rights? 
A. Competition and Justification 
To seek a positive account of competition wrongs, we might return to the 
initial observation that one typically does not need to answer for harm caused in 
the course of competition. Why would this be? Why would someone not have 
the standing to complain against the person who has harmed him or her? Why 
would we not have to answer if we have harmed another? 
For Ripstein and Dworkin and many in the rights tradition, these questions 
are quickly resolved by the fundamental place of individual liberty. We have to 
answer only for violating another’s sphere of sovereignty. Harm, as a general 





128. For the definition of a liberty-right (or privilege-right), see id. § 2.1.1. 
129. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
competition wrongs 
2065 
But suppose that harm were something for which we were generally obli-
gated to account. Might there be a different explanation—an explanation more 
particular to competition—for why the faster swimmer or whoever makes the 
better mousetrap need not apologize to fellow competitors who lose out? I think 
that there is. 
In The Possibility of Altruism, Thomas Nagel defends the idea that we may be 
rationally required to consider what matters to other people.
130
 But Nagel ob-
serves that competitive activities, like a boxing match, seem to present special 
contexts where self-concern is licensed in service of broader objective reasons: 
I wish to suggest that there are patently objective reasons for each fighter 
to pursue his own success without the slightest consideration for his op-
ponent. These derive from the objective reasons for holding the match in 
the first place . . . . These ends are ill served if the fighters assist each 
other. One cannot win a victory over a complaisant opponent. Certain 
limits to the outcome are set by the foul rules, heavy boxing gloves, and 
the presence of a physician who can stop the fight on medical grounds. 
But within those limits it is essential to the objective point of the match 
that the contestants themselves concentrate only on winning.
131
 
Nagel’s point is that competition may be a context in which objective reasons are 
best served by people focusing on their own subjective reasons. Altruism appro-
priately gives way to circumscribed egoism. 
There are, of course, objective reasons for having market competition, as 
well. These reasons stem from the way that market competition can advance so-
cial value. As Adam Smith famously observed, social benefits may sometimes be 
better advanced by profit-motivated behavior than by pure altruism: “By pursu-
ing his own interest [the merchant] frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”
132
 Like Nagel’s boxers, 
business competitors should—for everyone’s sake—be free from worrying about 
one another. We would never have a better mousetrap if everyone worried about 
putting each other out of business. In other words, the efficaciousness of market 
 
130. THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 3 (1970). 
131. Id. at 131-32. 
132. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 485 
(Edwin Cannan ed., The Modern Library 1994) (1776). 
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competition seems to be a reason to license competitors not to concern them-




According to this second picture, our license to harm others without answer-
ing for it is narrower. It is not the default, but rather only an immunity that we 
hold only insofar as we are engaged in a valuable competition.
134
 This does not 
mean that every choice must be assessed for its social value. Just as the boxer 
need not think about the permissible force of each punch, we have limited pre-
rogatives to pursue our individual objectives. We can build a better mousetrap, 
close our hotel, and take the last carton of milk without stressing over the possi-
ble repercussions. But when our conduct has the effect of undermining the 
broader values for which the immunity is granted, we do not have the same li-
cense to be free from answering for the harm we cause.
135
 When the mousetrap 
is a fraud, when the hotel is shuttered out of spite, or when one does not need 
 
133. Christopher McMahon describes this as a way in which “the implicit morality of the market” 
involves a relaxation of morality’s principle of nonmaleficence. Christopher McMahon, Mo-
rality and the Invisible Hand, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247, 262-63 (1981). As he correctly points 
out, though, this is a limited license: 
It must be emphasized, however, that while some relaxation of the requirement to 
refrain from harming others may be unavoidable if a free-enterprise system is to 
function optimally, it does not follow that this requirement has no legitimate place 
in such a system. For there are surely many economic situations in which respect 
for the principle of nonmaleficence would not reduce efficiency. And in such situa-
tions, there will be no economic justification for violating it. 
  Id. at 263. It is worth noting the contrast between this picture and Dworkin’s description of 
competition harms. McMahon’s thought, which I share, is that all harms are morally salient 
but that market (or other) competition can give us justification for them. Dworkin’s picture, 
in contrast, is that there is a range of harms that are simply not morally salient—that are 
merely a result of everyone swimming in their own lanes. 
134. For a different inversion of the theoretical default of individualism to one founded in altruism, 
see Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, 
Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1990). 
135. There are parallels between my claims here and the idea of abuse of rights, which is discussed 
in Lee Anne Fennell, Owning Bad: Leverage and Spite in Property Law, in CIVIL WRONGS AND 
JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW 415 (Paul B. Miller & John Oberdiek eds., 2020); and Larissa Katz, 
Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122 YALE L.J. 1444 (2013). 
But the cases and literature on abuse of property rights focuses on deliberately harmful or 
spiteful conduct, see Fennell, supra, at 421-23; Katz, supra, at 1448-49, whereas I am consider-
ing a broader category. I think this makes it an even thornier problem for rights-based theories 








In the competition cases that I have considered, there are potentially ready 
explanations for why the conduct in question is wrongful that connect directly 
with the interests of the public. The conduct that I have considered misleads 
consumers, or tends to make markets less efficient, or threatens the stability of 
beneficial social practices through free riding. It is all conduct inconsistent with 
the reasons for having the competition in the first place.
137
 This is why the con-
duct is wrong: society as a whole can reasonably object to it.
138
 And, as noted, 
courts and legal commentators repeatedly assert that competition law is con-
cerned with protecting the public, not competitors.
139
 
And yet, if I am correct, it does seem like competitors can be distinctively 
wronged when other actors engage in conduct that is at odds with these benefits 
to consumers. When they lose business, they suffer an injury. This injury is not 
a deprivation of right, for they had no right to their customers or their profits. 
Nor is it merely about the violation of the market norms, for what matters to 
them is the loss attributable to that violation rather than the violation itself. 
We should take this structure at face value. The wrong consists in a party suf-
fering a loss (harm) caused by actions of another party that were inconsistent with the 
broader social value of the competition. It is not a violation of the wronged party’s 
 
136. This claim about the milk purchase may strike some readers as implausible. Surely one does 
not wrong another by imprudent purchases, even if the others might have put the good to 
better use. I am less sure. If your wasteful use spoils my chance at a productive one, then it is 
not clear to me that I have no complaint. (Suppose you purchased the milk simply in order to 
pour it down the drain.) Especially in our current overstretched world, we would do well to 
regard conspicuous, excessive, or wasteful consumption as potentially grounding wrongs to 
others. 
137. Cf. Craig L. Carr, Fairness and Performance Enhancement in Sport, 35 J. PHIL. SPORT 193, 195 
(2008) (“I shall understand fairness to involve fidelity to social practice. . . . The unfairness is 
to be found in the fact that the cheater puts her interest in winning above the point and pur-
pose of the game itself. If everyone cheats when and wherever possible, there is little reason 
to play the game, for it seems most unlikely that the purpose of play—the demonstration of 
the excellence the sport is intended to test—will emerge under these circumstances.”). 
138. Ultimately, I am following an old and intuitive conception of business ethics. Ethically, the 
businessperson may compete—which may harm her competitors—but only in forms that typ-
ically advance overall social welfare. See, e.g., Frank Chapman Sharp, Some Problems of Fair 
Competition, 31 INT’L J. ETHICS 123, 131-32 (1921) (defending this position and using it to ex-
plain why predatory pricing is wrong). For a more modern version, see Lynn Sharpe Paine, 
Ideals of Competition and Today’s Marketplace, in ENRICHING BUSINESS ETHICS 91, 95-96 (Clar-
ence C. Walton ed., 1990). Cf. Paul, supra note 51 (manuscript at 24) (arguing that “we should 
consider economic coordination rights a public resource”). 
139. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
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rights, and yet it is a wrong for which that party has special standing to feel ag-
grieved.
140
 The wrong is unbound from any individual right. It involves individ-




Private law actually offers a model of this structure in an almost abandoned 
corner: public nuisance. At common law, public nuisance describes conduct that 
“involved some interference with the interests of the community at large.”
142
 But 
not anyone can sue for damages. Rather, a plaintiff “must have suffered harm of 
a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public.”
143
 Thus, 
structurally, public nuisance offers recourse for those who are specially harmed 
when someone acts in a generally wrongful way. Public nuisance has long been 
considered an anomalous cause of action, and its use has largely been cabined to 
certain fringe contexts. But competition law is rife with similar structures. Free 
riding, abuse of market power, misleading marketing, and so on are all essen-
tially treated as public nuisances giving rise to private wrongs. In all of these 
cases, the collective concerns ground a prohibition that, in turn, gives rise to in-
dividual grievances.
144
 Competition law, then, may be viewed as in part recog-
nizing and responding to these grievances. Even if the standards for liability are 
entirely public-regarding, the law may still be adjudicating private disputes over 
genuine moral wrongs. 
In what follows, I aim to illustrate this structure by thinking through two 
examples. My hope is to show that, in order to adjudicate whether a competition 
wrong occurred, courts inquire whether the defendant, who has caused harm to 
the plaintiff, has a justification for that harm. This is typically a question about 
 
140. Cf. David Owens, The Roles of Rights, in CIVIL WRONGS AND JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW, supra 
note 135, at 3 (defending the thought that a party may be wronged by violation of a general 
public convention). 
141. It may be objected that this account appears to afford standing without limits. Even if POM 
should have standing to sue, surely the dry cleaner for POM’s employees should not, even if 
she does lose business. One might be tempted at this point to appeal to proximate cause. But 
that doctrine generally depends on a right, which then defines the scope of liability. It is harder 
to use the doctrine for matters of public right. More generally, my argument poses a challenge 
to proximate cause so conceived. My own view is that the limitations on standing should be 
understood—both legally and morally—in terms of either actual causation (also called factual 
causation) or pragmatic administrative concerns. Of course, actual causation is notoriously 
hard to theorize or know, but that does not mean that it is not the theoretically correct ques-
tion. 
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
143. Id. § 821C. 
144. One might wonder whether this does not ground the wrongs in a right after all—a public 
right. I have no deep objection to that locution. What is important to see is that the individual, 
private grievance is not grounded in an individual, private right. 
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society as a whole. The inquiry is not whether there was a violation of a norm 
grounded in the plaintiff ’s interests or grounded in what conduct the plaintiff 
might reasonably reject; indeed, the norm in question might have little to do 
with the plaintiff at all. But the harm is something for which the defendant must 
answer if its conduct was not socially justifiable. 
B. Tortious Interference and Justification 
Return to tortious interference with contract or prospective business rela-
tions. Few would dispute that it can involve a genuine wrong—that is, few would 
dispute that the disappointed party may have standing to feel aggrieved. Azar 
wronged Lehigh in stealing away its signed customers. 
But what makes the interference tortious? One possibility is that contracts 
are property and any interference is tortious in the way that any trespass is tor-
tious. But it is not true that all interference with a contract is tortious. Azar’s 
interference would likely not have been tortious if he were acting only as a con-
cerned citizen. Another possibility is that interference is tortious when it is oth-
erwise illegal—fraud or intimidation or slander. The wrong would then be intel-
ligible as based on a right to have competitors abide by the rules. But interference 
can be tortious without being otherwise unlawful. 
Instead, what determines whether the interference is tortious will often de-
pend on a question of justification. Consider the following lengthy but lucid ex-
planation from Justice Traynor: 
 It is universally recognized that an action will lie for inducing breach 
of contract by a resort to means in themselves unlawful such as libel, 
slander, fraud, physical violence, or threats of such action. Most jurisdic-
tions also hold that an action will lie for inducing a breach of contract by 
the use of moral, social, or economic pressures, in themselves lawful, un-
less there is sufficient justification for such inducement. 
 Such justification exists when a person induces a breach of contract to 
protect an interest which has greater social value than insuring the sta-
bility of the contract. Thus, a person is justified in inducing the breach 
of a contract the enforcement of which would be injurious to health, 
safety, or good morals. The interest of labor in improving working con-
ditions is of sufficient social importance to justify peaceful labor tactics 
otherwise lawful, though they have the effect of inducing breaches of 
contracts between employer and employee or employer and customer. In 
numerous other situations, justification exists depending upon the im-
portance of the interest protected. The presence or absence of ill-will, 
sometimes referred to as “malice,” is immaterial, except as it indicates 
whether or not an interest is actually being protected. 
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 It is well established, however, that a person is not justified in induc-
ing a breach of contract simply because he is in competition with one of 
the parties to the contract and seeks to further his own economic ad-
vantage at the expense of the other. Whatever interest society has in en-
couraging free and open competition by means not in themselves unlaw-
ful, contractual stability is generally accepted as of greater importance 
than competitive freedom. Competitive freedom, however, is of suffi-
cient importance to justify one competitor in inducing a third party to 




Justice Traynor’s description makes clear the role that justifiability plays in 
the determination of the wrong. The wrong does not depend on the conduct’s 
being independently prohibited. Nor does it depend on its being done with mal-
ice. Instead, the wrong depends on whether there is “sufficient justification” for 
the conduct, which is a matter of how it impacts society at large. 
In light of the social value of market competition, competitive freedom op-
erates, for Justice Traynor, as a justification for a range of conduct, including 
trying to induce consumers to switch their allegiances when no contractual rela-
tionship exists. Like Nagel’s boxers, market actors are justified in pursuing their 
own interests in such cases because there are objective reasons for allowing such 
pursuit. 
But competitive freedom does not serve as a justification for inducing breach. 
Justice Traynor explained this by saying that contractual stability is of “greater 
importance,” but we can put it more clearly: whereas competitive market behav-
ior is generally beneficial for society, and thus licensed, interference with con-
tracts for competitive gain is not similarly beneficial. Allowing parties like Azar 
to compete by undermining their competitors’ contracts does not enhance social 
welfare.
146
 One has a justification—traced to the social value of market competi-
tion—for cutting into another’s profits by offering a better product, better prices, 
 
145. Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 112 P.2d 631, 632-33 (Cal. 1941) (in bank) (citations omitted). 
146. One possible response, at this point, might emphasize the parasitic nature of Azar’s conduct. 
In Private Wrongs, Arthur Ripstein offers a fascinating argument that some torts, seemingly 
depending on the tortfeasor’s motive, are actually based on the fact that the defendant uses 
the plaintiff ’s agency to his own ends. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 168-71 (2016) 
(discussing Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v. Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468). I am not convinced that 
this argument can offer a rights-based account of these cases. See Nicolas Cornell, Ripstein’s 
Buttery Rights: Comments on ‘Private Wrongs,’ 14 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 22, 25 (2016). 
But, even if Ripstein’s argument is successful, I do not think that it can be generalized to cover 
all tortious interference. Azar may have been deliberately using Lehigh’s agency in the actual 




or better promotion, but one has no similar justification for inducing breach of 
contract. That is not, however, to say that nothing can justify inducing breach of 
contract. Consumer groups can encourage breach to prevent harm to health or 
safety; labor unions can encourage employees to strike for better working con-
ditions; and so on. Parties do not simply have a right that others never induce 
breach. And yet parties are wronged when they suffer losses because someone 
has competed in a fashion at odds with the value of market competition.
147
 
C. Antitrust and Justification: Apple and Amazon 
My claim is that this same basic structure is continuous across other areas of 
competition law. Let me offer one final legal case—moving from tort law to an-
titrust law—that illustrates the way that real, complex competition disputes in-
volve questions of social justification, not questions of rights. In late 2009, Apple 
was preparing to introduce the iPad.
148
 It hoped that an attraction of the iPad 
would be the ability to read e-books.
149
 At the time, however, Amazon’s Kindle 
controlled ninety percent of the e-book market.
150
 Amazon had attracted Kindle 
users by offering desirable titles at a price of only $9.99, which was near or even 
below the wholesale price that Amazon paid to publishers.
151
 
The book-publishing industry at the time was dominated by the “Big Six” 
publishers.
152
 These publishers feared the “wretched $9.99 price point becom-
ing a de facto standard,” in the words of one Hachette executive.
153
 The pricing 
threatened to undermine sales of hardcopy books, which would often be listed 
for thirty dollars or more.
154
 Taking on Amazon, however, would be difficult. As 
one Penguin memo put it, “It will not be possible for any individual publisher to 
 
interferer need not be acting or gaining parasitically. The interferer may simply want the land-
lord to break the contract with a tenant so that he can lease the property himself. 
147. There are interesting connections between the account that I am offering and the public-law 
account offered in Neyers, supra note 17, at 187-95. 
148. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2015). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 299. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 298. The Big Six were Hachette, HarperCollins, Macmillan, Penguin, Random House, 
and Simon & Schuster. Id. Penguin and Random House have since merged. See Julie Bosman, 
Penguin and Random House Merge, Saying Change Will Come Slowly, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/business/media/merger-of-penguin-and-random 
-house-is-completed.html [https://perma.cc/Y4JA-ASPQ]. 
153. Apple, 791 F.3d at 300. 
154. Id. at 299-300. 
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mount an effective response, because of both the resources necessary and the risk 
of retribution, so the industry needs to develop a common strategy.”
155
 Noticing 
this dynamic among the publishers, Apple seized on the opportunity. It realized 
that it could get publishers onto its e-book platform if it could offer them a way 
to coordinate in breaking Amazon’s $9.99 pricing.
156
 
The mechanism Apple devised was clever, dangling the possibility of a new 
pricing model as an incentive to take on Amazon together. Specifically, Apple 
offered publishers an agency model, rather than the traditional wholesale model, 
thereby giving the publishers control over pricing.
157
 But, in order to ensure that 
Apple e-books were competitive, Apple’s in-house counsel contrived a mecha-
nism to make the publishers take on Amazon: a “most favored nation clause.”
158
 
The MFN clause required that, if customers were offered a lower price by any 
other reseller, then the publisher would have to match that lower price with Ap-
ple.
159
 In other words, if Amazon’s $9.99 pricing continued, publishers would 
take even bigger losses. It was a commitment that made continuing a wholesale 
relationship with Amazon financially intolerable. Apple thus facilitated con-
certed action among the publishers by simultaneously offering contracts to each 
publisher that required confronting Amazon.
160
 
The publishers signed on, and it worked: five of the Big Six publishers had 
accepted Apple’s terms when the iPad was publicly announced.
161
 The next day, 
Macmillan delivered an ultimatum to Amazon: switch to an agency model or 
lose access to new releases.
162
 The other publishers quickly followed suit. Within 
a few months, five publishers had agency relationships with Amazon.
163
 And the 
 
155. Id. at 300. 
156. Id. at 302. 
157. Id. at 303. 
158. Id. at 304. 
159. Id. 
160. Here is how the Second Circuit summarized the dynamic: 
Apple wanted quick and successful entry into the ebook market and to eliminate 
retail price competition with Amazon. In exchange, it offered the publishers an op-
portunity to confront Amazon as one of an organized group . . . united in an effort 
to eradicate the $9.99 price point. Both sides needed a critical mass of publishers 
to achieve their goals. The MFN played a pivotal role in this quid pro quo by stiff-
ening the spines of the publishers to ensure that they would demand new terms 
from Amazon, and protecting Apple from retail price competition. 
  Id. at 305 (citations and quotations omitted). 
161. Id. at 308. 
162. Id. 




prices shifted. According to DOJ experts, average e-book prices increased 23.9% 
over the year after the iPad’s introduction.
164
 
Did Apple’s conduct wrong Amazon? One can see an argument that it did. 
To gain a competitive advantage, Apple deliberately helped publishers take on 
Amazon. This was not a matter of offering a better product or a better price, but 
of displacing the market leader through concerted action.
165
 Apple effectively or-
chestrated a price-fixing conspiracy among the publishers. And, in 2015, the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed, on a 2-1 vote, a district court judgment finding Apple in 
violation of antitrust law.
166
 Apple agreed to pay $400 million to consumers in 
the form of cash and e-book credits.
167
 
One can also see an argument that Apple did not do anything wrong. The 
dissent, which has found moderate support among commentators,
168
 argued 
that the application of antitrust liability was inappropriate because Apple’s move 
was arguably procompetitive.
169
 Apple broke up Amazon’s monopoly of the e-
book market. According to this line of thought, Amazon’s below-cost pricing was 
a barrier to entry designed to prevent competition and assure market domi-
nance.
170
 Apple’s strategy broke into the market that Amazon was trying to wall 
off as its own. Viewed this way, Apple did not wrong Amazon because it was 
countering Amazon’s own anticompetitive behavior. 
 
164. Id. at 310. The average computed was a weighted average—that is, it measured the average 
increase in the price of e-books that were sold, thereby assigning greater weight to titles that 
sold more copies, rather than the average increase in price listings in the publishers’ e-book 
catalogue. See id. at 310 n.14. 
165. Admittedly, it can be hard to feel too much sympathy for a goliath like Amazon. But imagine 
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bookstore in a small town, and a would-be competitor entered the local market using similar 
tactics to Apple’s—simultaneous MFN clauses with all of the major publishers ensuring a col-
lective refusal to supply your store except on their terms. I think that one would—and 
should—feel resentment in such a situation. 
166. Apple, 791 F.3d at 296, 314. 
167. Adam Liptak & Vindu Goel, Supreme Court Declines to Hear Apple’s Appeal in E-Book Pricing 
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169. Apple, 791 F.3d at 341 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
170. For a discussion of the potentially problematic nature of Amazon’s strategy, see Khan, supra 
note 51. 
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Here is my central point: there can be wrongs committed in cases like this, 
but whether a wrong has occurred does not turn on whether any right was vio-
lated. If Amazon was wronged, it is not because it had any apparent right to do 
what it was doing.
171
 Obviously it had no right to a dominant position in the 
market.
 172
 If someone else offered e-books with a more attractive price or for-
mat, Amazon would have no right to keep its customers from going elsewhere. 
Amazon also had no right to a wholesale relationship with the major publishers. 
To the contrary, every publisher had a right to refuse to sell e-books wholesale—
it was only the conspiracy among them that was potentially impermissible. And 
Apple was yet a further step removed. Ultimately, if Amazon was wronged, it 
was not because its rights were violated, but because it lost out when Apple con-
spired against the public to raise e-book prices. 
If Amazon was not wronged, on the other hand, it seems to be only because 
Apple’s conduct was justifiable in light of its consequences for the market and 
consumers, not because Apple had a general entitlement to do as it did. The way 
for Apple to argue that it committed no wrong is to say that, in fact, its conduct 
was procompetitive. One might think that orchestrating price-fixing is simply 
against the rules. But perhaps not when it is used to combat predatory or other-
wise abusive pricing by a monopolist.
173
 That is the argument that convinced the 
dissenting judge. 
Whichever argument one accepts, the relevant inquiry is whether the harm 
to Amazon was the result of action that was good or bad for the market as a 
whole. In this light, it is understandable that antitrust law has been dominated 
by economic reasoning whittling away at per se rules, shifting instead towards 
more case-specific inquiry into reasonableness.
174
 But we should not conclude 
that, because economic reasoning figures in the inquiry, the law is not making a 
 
171. The point is not simply that antitrust adjudication tends towards standards that turn on con-
text-specific, post hoc justification, though the recent evolution of antitrust doctrine squarely 
in that direction is strongly supportive. See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust 
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moral judgment about the relationship between the parties.
175
 The economic 
reasoning captures a way that one market participant’s conduct may or may not 
be justifiable to another. 
In this way, antitrust law may be about efficiency and perhaps other public 
values, and it may be, simultaneously, about moral wrongs committed in the 
course of market competition. It is, in this light, a moral institution recognizing 
forms of relational accountability, like other areas of private law. Current theo-
rizing about competition law seems to ignore this dimension, despite the fact 
that it is readily apparent in the law’s doctrinal structure. Perhaps a richer picture 
of our possible moral relations can thus morally enrich our conception of com-
petition law itself. 
D. Competition Wrongs Beyond the Market 
I have focused on wrongs that arise in the course of market competition, but 
the argument applies to wrongs in other competitions as well. Wrongs to com-
petitors are hardly limited to the business world. In the rest of life too, we may 
find ourselves committing or suffering wrongs in the course of competition. 
And, in these contexts too, I believe that wrongs cannot always be explained in 
terms of the violation of a competitor’s right. 
Consider sports, for example. To return to Dworkin’s evocative metaphor, 
we are swimming in our own lanes, and we have a right that others not invade 
that space. That is an important insight. But it does not follow that, because we 
cannot cross the lane lines, we are morally unconcerned with what happens in 
the rest of the pool. When contestants lose to competitors who have adopted 
new tactics potentially at odds with the underlying values of the competition—
be it more buoyant swimsuits or human-growth hormones—it is natural to see 
the losing contestants as wronged, even though no transgression of the existing 
rules has occurred. The same may even extend to those who lose when compet-
itors adopt strategies that appear at odds with the spirit of the game: the “hack-
a-Shaq” in basketball, feigning injuries in soccer, the neutral-zone trap in hockey, 
and grunting or time-wasting in tennis. The complaint of the competitor when 
such tactics are taken to the extreme is at least intelligible. Whether we see the 
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133, at 254. The thought is that certain moral rules, shaped by economic theory, arise in market 
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ity of the market as “public morality” in the way that McMahon does. Id. at 267. 
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competitor as truly aggrieved depends on whether we see the tactic as wrong-
ful—as at odds with the general or public value of the activity—or as merely 
crafty. But it has nothing to do with the rights of the losing party. 
Games are, however, an artificial context. In real life, competition wrongs 
arise with more organic nuance and complexity. Here it is even more clear that 
one may lose out on important goods because another transgresses—not against 
you but against another or against broader collective aims. One misses out on 
one’s dream apartment because another applicant embellishes her application to 
the landlord; one is passed over for a promotion at work in favor of a coworker 
who will assist the manager in papering over, rather than addressing, the unit's 
lack of productivity; one’s careful contribution to an intellectual discussion is 
overshadowed by another person’s flashy obfuscation. It would be perversely an-
tagonistic, I think, to view ourselves as perpetually having rights against one an-
other as rival competitors. We should not respond to such cases by thinking that 
we simply need to be clearer about the lane lines in some metaphoric race. And 
yet these injuries from others’ transgressions are real, and they are personal. The 
stinging resentment that they can generate when suffered is not inapt; nor is the 
felt need to offer moral repair when we have been the illegitimate victor. 
One place where we see and feel this sort of injury most sharply is in love. In 
Pride and Prejudice, Mr. Darcy is wronged by Mr. Wickham’s deceitful pursuit of 
Elizabeth Bennet.
176
 Though it is Elizabeth to whom the lies are told, we none-
theless recognize this as a wrong to Darcy who loses in the comparison.
177
 In 
Anthony Trollope’s Chronicles of Barsetshire, John Eames is forever prevented 
from marrying his love, Lily Dale, because she was disingenuously courted and 
then scorned by Mr. Crosbie—a wrong justifying even a brawl.
178
 In each case, 
the false treatment of a lover wrongs the scorned rival as well. Of course, no one 
has a right to reciprocation of one’s love, but that does not mean that we are not 
wronged by the underhanded adversary when it is lost. In Anna Karenina, Levin 
reflects, “Yes, she was bound to choose him. That’s the way it has to be, and I 
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can’t blame anyone or anything. It’s my fault. What right did I have to think that 
she would want to join her life to mine?”
179
 Such reasoning is mistaken: one may 
indeed have no right to hard-to-win goods like love, and yet one may still be 
wronged when those goods go to others who have won them illegitimately. 
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